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THE GREEN ASPECTS OF PRJN1Z: 1 
THE REVIVAL OF FEDERALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
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INTRODUCTION 
On November 30, 1993, President William Jefferson Clinton signed 
legislation to create a five-day waiting period and background check for 
the purchase of handguns. 2 The signing ceremony for the so-called Brady 
bill capped a fierce, seven-year, legislative battle between gun control 
' With apologies to Shakespeare: "There is, betwixt that smile we would aspire to/ That sweet 
aspect of princes .... " WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY Vlll act 3, sc. 2. 
2 See Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Signs Bill on Guns into Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1993, at 
A20. Technically, the waiting period was five government working days. 
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advocates and grass-roots gun owner groups such as the National Rifle 
Association. However, no sooner did the Brady bill become law than the 
fighting moved to a new arena: federal courts. Throughout the country 
lawsuits were filed as the Brady law's provisions took effect, charging that 
Congress had overstepped its constitutional bounds.3 
While the congressional debate over the Brady Act focused on the 
wisdom, or lack thereof, of federal gun control laws, and their legitimacy 
under the Second Amendment, 4 the court challenges to the Brady Act 
focused on something altogether different: the proper distribution of power 
between state and local authorities and the federal government. Printz v. 
United State~ was not a case about gun control, it was a case about 
federal power. On these grounds, the Supreme Court found the Brady Act 
unconstitutional and the sweep of federal power over state and local 
governments to be limited. 
The Printz decision came on the heels of two other important chal-
lenges to federal authority, New York v. United Statei and United States 
v. Lopez.7 In all three, a majority on the Court recognized that the Consti-
tution created a federal government of limited powers and reserved a 
substantial degree of state autonomy. "Dual sovereignty," which ensures a 
balance of federal and state power, is an essential component of the 
federalist system. Reports of federalism's death were exaggerated.8 
The revival of federalism could have profound implications for 
environmental protection. Because most federal environmental laws rely L11 
some degree upon the states for their implementation, one fmds all of the 
conflicts and cooperative ventures that characterize the federal-state 
3 See, e.g., Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v. United States, 
854 F. Supp 1503 (D. Mont 1994). 
4 Although the Supreme Court has never invalidated a gun control law on Second Amendment 
grounds, there is substantial scholarship to suggest that it should. See David B. Kopel & Christopher 
C. Little, Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and Guns: Assessing the Case for Fireanns Prohibition, 
56 MD. L. REv. 438,516-25 (1997); see also STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: 
THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2d ed. 1994); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND 
BEAR ARMs: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. 
Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 
(1991); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Anns, 43 DUKE L.J. 
1236 (1994). But see Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1365 (1993); 
Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Anns, 
71 J. AM. H!ST. 22 (1984); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The 
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 551 (1991). 
' 117 S. Ct 2365 (1997) . 
• 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
7 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Several other recent cases reinforce the revival of federalism. See infra 
note 95. 
' The Garcia dissent began: 'Tflhis decision substantialiy alters the federal system embodied in 
the Constitution .... "Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,557 (1985) (Powell, 
I., dissenting). 
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relationship in contemporary environmental policy. Indeed, much of what 
is considered "federal" environmenta1 protection is administered by the 
states.9 State cooperation, however, is not always willing; federal environ-
mental statutes often include measures to induce state cooperation.10 Thus, 
any constitutional jurisprudence that limits the ability of Congress to set 
national policy for the states will reverberate through environmental policy. 
This Comment reviews the Printz decision in the context of the 
Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence and assesses its impli-
cations for environmenta1 law. Part I provides a brief historical overview 
of the federal-state relationship in the environmental context and recent 
Supreme Court decisions on federalism. Part II discusses and evaluates the 
Printz decision. Part ill applies the Supreme Court holdings in Printz and 
related federalism cases to current environmenta1 policies and identifies 
federal environmental programs that are constitutionally suspect. Finally, 
Part N addresses the public policy concern that limiting the federal 
government's power in the environmenta] context will inevitably weaken 
environmental protection. 
I. BACKGROUND 
"So much political power has been reallocated to the federal govern-
ment that, at times, the states could be mistaken for vassals of the federal 
government." 11 
A. The Federal-State Relationship in the Environmental Context 
The current federal-state environmental framework developed in the 
1970s as environmenta1 protection became a national political concem.12 
Prior to that time, environmental protection was largely the responsibility 
of state and local governments, occasionally augmented by federal com-
mon law. 13 Although federal funding of environmental research and staie-
9 See infra Part I.A. 
10 States and localities have vigorously protested federal impositions. Some have even gone to 
court challenging federal environmental rules. See infra Parts I.A, m.c. 
11 John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 
1185 (1995) (emphasis added). 
12 A brief history of these developments can be found in JONATIIAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTAL-
ISM AT TiiE CROSSROADS 21-24 (1995) [hereinafter ADLER, ENVIRONMENTAUSM]. For a more detailed 
discussion of the environmental movement's history, see RILEY E. DUNLAP & ANGElA G. MERTIG, 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAUSM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MoVEMENT: 1970-1990 (1992); PHiLIP 
SHABECOfF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993). 
13 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary 
Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141, 1148, 1152-60 (1995). 
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level pollution control efforts began in the late 1940s, such efforts were 
relatively minor. 14 The federal regulations of that era dealt with federal 
agencies or uniquely federal concerns, such as keeping navigable water-
ways free from obstructions.15 
The federal presence in environmental policy exploded in the 1970s. 
Beginning in 1969, Congress enacted a series of sweeping federal statutes 
to regulate environmental quality at the national level, including the 
National Environmental Policy Act (1969),16 the Clean Air Act (1970),17 
the Clean Water Act (1972),18 the Endangered Species Act (1973),19 the 
Safe Drinking Water Act (1974)/0 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (1975),21 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(1976),22 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (1976),23 among others. 
Yet, the federal government does not implement environmental protection 
on its own. Rather, most major federal environmental statutes establish 
environmental standards at the national level but encourage a significant 
degree of enforcement and implementation at the state or locallevel.24 
Most of the early environmental laws seemed to work well. During 
the 1970s and 1980s, many indicators of environmental quality showed 
distinct improvement.25 Federal regulations undoubtedly played a role in 
this improvement, as did other factors.26 In recent years, however, con-
14 Though minor, financial assistance to local governments for environmental matters was still 
controversial. In 1956, President Eisenhower vetoed funding for municipal sewage treatment plants 
because such concerns were "strictly local." Congress then overrode Eisenhower's veto. See id. at 
1155-56. 
" "To the extent that federal law was regolatory in character prior to 1970, the primary targets 
of envi.ronmentai reguiation were federal agencies rather than private industry." ld. at 1158. For 
example, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958 was primarily concerned with ensuring that 
federal projects did not unduly impact wildlife. See Pub. L. No. 85-624, 72 Stat. 563 (1958) (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667e (1994)). 
16 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4347 (1994). 
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-766lf. Note, the first federal clean air legislation was passed in 1955 (Pub. 
L. No. 80-159), with subsequent amendments in 1963, 1965, 1966, and 1967. However, it is common 
to speak of the Clean Air Act as a 1970 law since that is when the current federal regolatory structure 
was put in place. 
" 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1385 (1994). The Clean Water Act is formally known as the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act 
19 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). 
20 42 u.s.c. §§ 300f-300j (1994). 
21 7 u.s.c. §§ 136-136y (1994). 
22 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992k (1994). 
23 15 u.s.c. §§ 2601·2671 (1994). 
24 See Percival, supra note 13, at ll74. 
25 See, e.g., Jonathan Adler & Peter Cazamias, Benchmarks: The Ecological and Economic Trends 
that Are Shaping the Natural Environment and Human Societies, in THE TRUE STAlE OF TilE PLANET 
393, 438-453 (Ron Bailey ed., 1995); BORIS DEWEll. ET AL., INDEX OF LEADING ENviRONMENTAL 
INDICATORS FOR TilE U.S. AND CANADA (1997). 
26 See Indur Goklany, Richer Is Cleaner, in TRUE STArn, supra note 25, at 339. According to one 
prominent environmental analyst, "[t]he fact that at least some measures of air quality were improving 
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cerns have increased about the ability of a national, centralized regulatory 
structure to address environmental problems that are largely local and 
regional in nature. According to the United States Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations, "federal rules and procedures governing 
decision-making for protecting the environment often are complex, con-
flicting, difficult to apply, adversarial, costly, inflexible and uncertain."27 
In 1995, the National Academy of Public Administration concluded that 
"EPA and Congress need to hand more responsibility and decision-making 
authority over to the states."28 Today, it is increasingly recognized that 
"the system has grown to the point where it amounts to nothing less than 
a massive effort at Soviet-style planning of the economy to achieve 
environmental goals."29 
In this context, it should be no surprise that "national environmental 
policy has surged to the forefront of contemporary federalism debates due 
to the growth of federal environmental regulation."30 Thus, as the Su-
preme Court breathes new life into regulatory federalism, environmental 
policy will feel the impact-indeed it already has. 31 
I. Cooperative Federalism 
Most major federal environmental laws that do not empower federal 
agencies to regulate environmental impacts directly follow a model of 
"cooperative federalism," in which the federal government outlines a 
regulatory program, and then entices states to implement the program in 
lieu of the federal government. State implementation is typically subject to 
federal approval, and may receive limited funding from the national 
at an impressive rate before 1970 suggests that other factors in addition to the [Clean Air Act] are be-
hind ... recent improvements." Paul Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PuBuc POLICIES FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECI10N 51 (Paul Portney ed., 1990). 
A good example of dramatic environmental improvement that cannot be attributed to federal 
regulatory programs is the increased rate of wetland restoration and conservation in the late 1980s and 
1990s such that by 1997 one could claim that the United States achieved the official policy goal of "no 
net loss." This trend is primarily the result of private efforts and voluntary, incentive-based programs, 
such as the North American Waterfowl Management Plan and Partners for Wildlife. See JONATHAN 
ToLMAN, SWAMPED: How AMERICA ACIDEVED 'No NET Loss' (CEI 1997). 
21 U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
DECISIONMAKING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECI10N AND PuBLIC WORKS 1 (1992), cited in Percival, 
supra note 13, at II65. 
28 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PuB. ADMIN., SETIING PRIORITIES, GETIING REsULTS: A NEW DIREC-
TION FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECI10N AGENCY (1995), cited in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PuB. 
ADMIN., REsOLVING THE PARADOX OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECI10N 5 (1997). 
29 Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. 
J. ENVTJ... L. 153, 154 (1988). 
30 Percival, supra note 13, at Il4l. 
" See infra Part ill.A. 
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treasury. Typically, states must show they can administer the given 
program in accordance with federal guidelines. Requirements can range 
from local pollution control measures and guidelines for consideration of 
permit applications to criminal enforcement policies and state rules on 
standing for citizen suits. While each state may tailor its program to 
particular state needs, to gain federal approval all states must operate with-
in the constraints outlined in federal law or regulation.32 Commentators 
often refer to cooperative federalism as a "partnership" between the state 
and federal governments, albeit an unequal one.33 
According to Adam Babich, former editor of the Environmental Law 
Reporter, "[t]he essence of cooperative federalism is that states take 
primary responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining 
the freedom to apply their own, more stringent standards."34 The alterna-
tive for states is federal preemption of their programs and, in some cases, 
the imposition of federal sanctions, such as a cutoff of federal highway 
funds or increased regulatory requirements. Statutes which embody this 
approach include the Clean Air Act,35 the Clean Water Act/6 the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act,37 portions of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act,38 and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.39 
There are three reasons typically given for adopting the cooperative 
federalism model.40 First, the federal government could not hope to 
implement all environmental regulatory programs on its own. "The federal 
government ... is dependent upon state and local authorities to implement 
these policies because of the nation's size and geographic diversity, the 
close interrelation between environmental controls and local land use deci-
32 
"In most environmental statutes, Congress has reserved a substantial role for states, particularly 
in the implementation and enforcement of federal standards, but Congress has kept most of the 
fundamental policy-making authority for itself or the federal agencies." John Dwyer, The Practice of 
Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 1184 (1995). 
" See id. at 1190 ("Although the states are by no means equal partners in regulating the 
environment, they paradoxically remain indispensable partners.''). 
34 Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. 
REv. 1516, 1534 (1995). In Babich's model, successful cooperative federalism requires that the federal 
government observe five principles: "(1) provide for state implementation; (2) set clear standards; (3) 
reflect respect for state autonomy; (4) provide mechanisms to police the process; and (5) apply the 
same rules to government and private parties." Id. 
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-766lf (1994). 
J6 33 u.s.c. §§ 1251-1385 (1994). 
J7 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992k (1994). 
J8 ld. §§ 300f-300j. 
" 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994). See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 
452 U.S. 264 (1981) (holding that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act is a constitutional 
example of cooperative federalism). 
"' See Dwyer, supra note 32, at 1217; Percival, supra note 13, at 1174-75; see generally DENISE 
SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY: TRUST AND TilE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTA-
TION (1997). 
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sions, and federal officials' limited implementation and enforcement 
resources."41 Since the 1970s, analysts have recognized that centralized 
federal environmental regulation is destined to fail insofar as it fails to 
enlist support at the state and local level;42 "[t]he inadequacy of federal 
resources in comparison to the magnitude of environmental problems 
inevitably results in federal dependence on state and local authorities."43 
Second, environmental concerns and potential solutions are not the 
same throughout the United States. To succeed in a given locale, environ-
mental policies must be tailored to local conditions. Due to their familiarity 
with state and local conditions, state and local officials are apt to have 
local expertise that is unobtainable by national agencies.44 John Dwyer 
notes that "[t]he knowledge necessary to administer any air pollution con-
trol program ... can be found only at the local level."45 The relative 
sources and composition of urban air pollution varies from place to place. 
The nature of air pollution concerns in Phoenix, Arizona, differs from that 
in Atlanta, Georgia.46 Much the same can be said for virtually every 
pollution control issue. 47 
Finally comes politics. Environmental programs, insofar as they seek 
to regulate land-use, lifestyles and local economic activity, are inevitably 
controversial. Without local political support, federal environmental offi-
cials fmd implementing environmental programs extremely difficult. 48 Yet 
insofar as the federal government enlists state and local officials to 
cooperate, local concerns about federal intrusions into local matters dimin-
ish. Federal officials will also gain the benefit of having state and local 
41 Richard B. Stewan, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Im-
plementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. II96, ll96 (1977). 
42 Some would argue that it is destined to fail regardless. See Fred L. Smith, Jr., Markets and the 
Environment: A Critical Reappraisal, 13 CONTEMP. EcoN. PoL'Y 62 (1995) [hereinafter Smith, A 
Critical Reappraisal]. 
43 See Stewan, supra note 41, at 1201. 
44 This is essentially the Hayekian argument about the impossibility of centralizing infonnation. 
See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. EcON. REv. 519 (1945). Of 
course, Hayek might be skeptical about the ability to centralize infonnation at the state level as well. 
45 Dwyer, supra note 32, at 1218. 
46 See NATIONAL REs. COUNCll .. , RETHINKING Tiffi OZONE PROBLEM IN URBAN AND REGIONAL 
AIR POLLUTION 351 {1991). 
47 For example, soil composition and hydrology will effect the likelihood of groundwater con-
tamination from runoff or waste disposal; population density and topography will effect the likely 
public health impact of industrial accidents; weather patterns, such as the frequency of inversions, will 
effect ambient concentrations of air pollutants, and so on. 
46 At the extreme, concerns about federal environmental policy have provoked a strong, 
potentially violent, backlash. One example of the backlash is the so-called "county supremacy" 
movement, which seeks to assert local control over land-use, particularly in areas dependent upon 
federal lands, which are necessarily subject to federal regulations. See Stephen Halbrook, Fear and 
Loathing Out West, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 1. For a critique of the county supremacy 
movement, see Alexander H. Southwell, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federalism Im-
plications of a 1990s States' Rights Battle, 32 GoNZAGA L. REv, 2 (1996/1997). 
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intermediaries when polities are ill-conceived or overly burdensome.49 By 
obscuring the lines of accountability, cooperative federalism undermines 
accountability. 
Although cooperative federalism has had its problems, some of which 
this Comment will discuss, it is generally preferred over the alternatives: 
direct federal regulation to preempt state efforts or encouragement through 
fmancial incentives.50 Moreover, unlike federal efforts to directly con-
script state officials to assist in federal programs, cooperative federalism 
has the explicit endorsement of the Supreme Court.51 
2. The Limits of Cooperation 
Despite the formal effort to create and maintain a state-federal 
partnership on environmental issues, there is substantial state and local 
resistance to federal environmental programs. Observers note that "federal 
environmental standards have been a chronic source of friction for federal-
state relations. "52 This is due, in part, to the proliferation of "unfunded 
mandates"-federal requirements upon state and local governments to 
administer or comply with federal regulatory programs, unaccompanied by 
sufficient funds to cover the mandates' cost. "Few contemporary issues 
concern state and local policymakers as intensely as unfunded man-
dates."53 
According to Governing magazine, by 1994 "at least 400 separate 
subsections of the Code of Federal Regulations involving environmental 
matters apply to local govenunents; another 400 require iocal governments 
to enforce federal environmental requirements."54 The total annual cost of 
such rules for state and local governments was expected to hit $50 billion 
by the end of the decade.55 But the effects of unfunded mandates run 
deeper than their impact on city budgets. As one local health official 
49 Fonner Natural Resources Defense Council attorney David Schoenbrod noted that ''federal 
mandates give federal legislators and the president the means to take credit for the benefits of 
environmental programs while placing the blame for any ensuing costs on state and local officials." 
David Schoenbrod, Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards, in ENviRONMENTAL 
FEDERALISM 264 (Terry Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997). 
50 Examples of the fanner are the Toxic Substances Control Act and federal automobile emission 
standards. Examples of the latter are the land-use planning provisions of the Coastal Zone Management 
Act and subtitle D of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
51 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289. 
52 Percival, supra note 13, at ll44. 
" Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On 
Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (1993). 
54 Tom Arrandale, A Guide to Environmental Mandates, GoVERNING, Mar. 1994, at 36. As a 
result, Arrandale reports, "state and local officials find themselves scouring the Federal Register and 
conferring with EPA to keep abreast of evolving requirements." /d. 
" See id. 
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commented, "[w]hat bothers me is that the new rules coming out of Wash-
ington are taking money from decent programs and making me waste them 
on less important problems. It kills you as a city official to see this kind of 
money spent for nothing."56 
In the early 1990s, state and local concerns about the proliferation of 
unfunded mandates came to the fore. 57 Whereas there were 150 federal 
mandates in 1960, there were 498 in 1979.58 Federal aid to state and local 
governments increased substantially over this period as well, from $7 
billion to $83 billion.59 The growth in mandates spurred a ground swell 
of opposition from state and local governments. 60 After the congressional 
elections of 1994, unfunded mandates rose to the top of Congress' legisla-
tive agenda,61 and mandate relief was one of the first elements of the 
"Contract with America" enacted into law and signed by President 
Clinton.62 However, this law, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 
1995, was more symbolic than substantive. The law does nothing to limit 
or reduce preexisting unfunded mandates. Instead it merely established new 
reporting and procedural requirements for enactments that would produce 
substantial new unfunded mandates.63 This may limit the proliferation of 
unfunded mandates in the future, but will not reduce those already in 
place. 
56 Keith Schneider, How a Rebellion Over Environmental Rules Grew from a Patch of Weed!-, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1993, at Al5 (quoting Michael J. Pompilli, head of the envirorunental health 
division, Columbus, Ohio, Health Department). 
57 See THOMAS J. DILORENZO, UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES: ENviRONMENTAliSM'S ACHILLES 
HEEL? (1993); Susan E. Leckrone, Note, Turning Back the Clock: The Urifunded Mandates Reform Act 
of 1995 and Its Effective Repeal of Environmental Legislation, 71 IND. LJ. I 029 ( 1996). 
58 See Robert H. Freilich & David G. Richardson, Returning to a General Theory of Federalism: 
Framing aNew Tenth Amendment United States Supreme Court Case, 26 URB. LAw. 215,222 (1994). 
~~~ -
60 Victor H. Ashe, Mayor of Knoxville, Tennessee, wrote that "[g]one are the days when mayors, 
city council members, county executives and county commissioners would simply shrug and say, 
'Well, Congress says we have to."' Victor H. Ashe, A View from the Commission, INTERGOVERNMEN-
TAL PERsP., Fall 1992, at 2. 
61 An indication of how seriously Congress took this issue is the fact that the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) was introduced in the Senate as S.I. 
62 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat 48 (1995) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 658-658d, 1501-1504). 
It is also worth noting that President Clinton independently sought to quell the rebellion over unfunded 
federal mandates by issuing an executive order on "Enhancing the Intergoverrunental Partnership" 
barring federal agencies from issuing unnecessary unfunded mandates. Exec. Order No. 12,875, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 58093 (1993). 
63 
"By itself, the UMRA will not accomplish real change over the long run because its major 
enforcement mechanism-a point of order on the floor against any legislation that proposes an 
unfunded mandate-is waivable by a simple majority vote." Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental 
Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REv. 
97, 99 (1996). For a critical overview of UMRA, see Angela Antonelli, Promises Unfulfilled: Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, REG., 1996 No.2, at 44. See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNfiNG OFFICE, 
GAO/GGD-9830, UNFUNDED MANDATES: REFoRM Acr HAs HAD LITfLE EFFEcT ON AGENClFS' 
RULEMAKING ACI10NS (1998). 
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State and local officials complain that the federal government is too 
rigid and means-oriented in its application of environmental law, hamper-
ing the ability of the states to enact sensible environmental policies. The 
Environmental Protection Agency, in particular, "has increasingly over-
stepped its bounds and usurped the lawmaking responsibilities of Congress 
and stepped on the state's ability to implement environmental reform," 
complained Michigan Governor John Engler.64 His is not an isolated 
view. According to one commentator who surveyed state environmental 
officials, "states resent what they believe to be an overly prescriptive 
federal orientation toward state programs, especially in light of stable or 
decreasing grant awards.'l65 Thus, states want more autonomy to imple-
ment environmental programs without being forced to kow-tow to the EPA 
and its assessment of local environmental needs. 
Finally, independent polling suggests that the American public has 
become increasingly sympathetic to the idea of devolving authority over 
environmental programs to the state and local level. In 1996, national 
polling of registered voters found that "most Americans support a greater 
role for state and local governments in environmental policy, and a re-
duced role for Washington."66 Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg also 
found that "[t]or ordinary citizens, devolution is a way of making the 
environmental regime more responsive, more flexible and sensible.'l67 
B. The Supreme Court's Federalism Jurisprudence 
Given the growth in political pressure for a greater sharing of power 
over regulatory matters, particularly in the environmental context, court 
decisions which expand the autonomy of state and local governments will 
encourage the decentralization of authority over environmental programs. 
Until quite recently, however, it seemed unlikely that the Supreme Court 
would move in that direction. 
1. Background 
In 1976, the Court sought to outline a test to protect states from 
.. Governor John Engler, Speech Before Warren T. Brookes Fellowship Memorial Dinner (last 
modified Nov. 19, 1996) <http://www.cei.org/pubs/1996/Brooks-eng1er.html>. 
65 SCHEBERLE, supra note 40, at 186. 
06 Jonathan H. Adler & Kellyanne Fitzpatrick, For the Environment, Against Overregulation, 
WALL ST. I., July 29, 1996, at A12. This article summarizes the results of 1HE POlLING Co., A 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF ATIITUDES ON ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY (CEI 1996). 
67 STANLEY B. GREENBERG, AGAINST TilE TIDE: IN DEFENSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUTY 4 
(1995). 
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undue congressional interference. In National League of Cities v. Usery,68 
a closely divided Court held that "Congressional enactments which may be 
fully within the grant of legislative authority contained in the Commerce 
Clause may nonetheless be invalid" if they infringe upon state sover-
eignty.69 In National League of Cities, the Court relied upon the Tenth 
Amendment to invalidate Congress' attempt to apply the minimum wage 
and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) to state 
and local. governments.70 "We have repeated1y recognized that there are 
attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may 
not be impaired by Congress," the Court held.71 In particular, the majority 
argued that "insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly 
displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of 
traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority 
granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3."72 In dissent, Justice Brennan noted 
that Court precedent did not support the proposition that otherwise valid 
federal regulations are voiqed merely because a state is involved.73 
Despite the language of National League of Cities, state efforts to 
challenge federal laws did not fare well in the 1980s. In 1981, the Virginia 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Association unsuccessfully challenged the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,74 inter alia, on Tenth 
Amendment grounds. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Association, the 
Court held that the law in question did not regulate the "[s]tates as states," 
rather it regulated the activities of private mine operators.75 It merely gave 
the states the option of either accepting preemptive federal regulations, or 
regulating in accordance with federal guidelines. "If a State does not wish 
to submit a proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and 
implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the 
Federal Government. "76 This form of "cooperative federalism" the Court 
ruled, was constitutional;77 "[t]he denomination of an activity as a 'local' 
or 'intrastate' activity does not resolve the question whether Congress may 
.. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
69 /d. at 841. 
70 The FLSA had applied to private employers since 1938. See id. at 836. In 1961 Congress 
extended the FLSA to cover employees of government "enterprises" that were engaged in commerce, 
and the FLSA was applied to state hospitals and schools in 1966. See id. at 837. Each of these moves 
was upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). National League of Cities challenged Congress' 
attempt to extend the FLSA to all state employees in 1974. 
71 /d. at 845. 
72 /d. at 852. 
73 See id. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
" 30 u.s.c. §§ 1201-1328 (1994). 
75 452 u.s. 264, 287 (1981). 
76 /d. at 288. 
72 /d. at 289. 
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regulate it under the Commerce Clause.'m 
The Court considered similar issues in Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) v. Mississippi/9 a 1982 challenge to the constitution-
ality of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978.80 In 
FERC v. Mississippi, the Court reaffirmed that federal action is not neces-
sarily invalid if it serves to "curtail or prohibit the States' prerogatives to 
make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may consider 
important.''81 In the case of PURP A, since Congress had the Commerce 
Clause power to pre-empt any state regulation of electric utilities, it could 
adopt a "less intrusive scheme and [allow] States to continue regulating in 
the area on the condition that they consider the suggested federal stan-
dards.''82 In such instances, the Cou1i: ruled, states always retained the 
ability to opt out of the regulatory endeavor, so there was nothing in the 
Act '"directly compelling' the States to enact a legislative program. "83 
· It was only a matter of time before the Supreme Court officially 
disavowed the ostensible limits upon federal power contained in National 
League of Cities, for as a practical matter, the National League of Cities 
test was unworkable.84 Indeed, "between National League of Cities and 
Garcia, t.he Court failed to fmd any federal statute unconstitutional under 
the National League of Cities test, a telling sign that National League of 
Cities was not in any way, shape, or form protecting state sovereignty.''85 
Not even the pretense of federalism upheld by National League of Cities 
would last long. 
In 1985 the Court explicitly overturned National League of Cities L11 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.86 In Garcia, the 
Court considered a virtually identical case: whether a local government 
entity, in this case a metropolita11 transit authority, was exempt from the 
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. Justice Blackmun, 
who had concurred in National League of Cities, concluded that the 
"traditional government functions" test was "unworkable" and should be 
18 Id. at 281. 
79 456 u.s. 742 (1982). 
80 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat 3ll7 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2643 (1994)). 
81 FERC, 456 U.S. at 759 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290). 
81 /d. at 765. 
83 /d. 
84 
'The Court was led into a path of certain defeat by following an exclusive sphere of authority 
approach to the relationship of federalism between the federal government and state and local 
governments." Freilich & Richardson, supra note 58, at 217 . 
., /d. at 218. Note, however, that "[s]ince its decision in 1976, National League of Cities has been 
cited or quoted in opinions joined by every Member of the present Court" Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 558 (1985) {Powell, J., dissenting). 
06 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557. 
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overruled. 87 Indeed, the Court disavowed judicial efforts to determine 
whether particular exercises of the Commerce Clause power ever intrude 
onto state sovereignty: 
State sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by procedural safe-
guards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created 
limitations on federal power .... [T]he principal and basic limit on the federal 
commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action--the built-in 
restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal 
governmental action.88 
In other words, if state sovereignty needs to be protected, then Congress 
will protect it, and the courts will not. Justice Powell, in dissent, warned 
that the Court's "decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to 
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause."89 
The Court reaffmned the Garcia approach to federalism three years 
later in South Carolina v. Baker.90 In Baker the Court held that "[s]tates 
must fmd their protection from congressional regulation through the 
national political process, not through judicially defmed spheres of 
unregulable state activity."91 According to some commentators, the Garcia 
opinion "appeared to have signaled the end of judicial federalism and the 
demise of the Tenth Amendment as a constitutional limit on Congress' 
Commerce Clause powers."92 Justice Rehnquist was not so sure. In dissent, 
he predicted that federalism would "in time again command the support of 
a majority of this Court."93 
81 /d. at 546. 
88 /d. at 552, 556. The Court endorsed Justice Brennan's argument in dissent in National League 
of Cities that states should simply look after themselves in the political process as "[d]ecisions upon 
the extent of federal intervention under the Commerce Clause into the affairs of the States are ... deci-
sions of the States themselves." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876 (1976). It is 
doubtful that Justice Brennan would adopt a similar approach to the other constitutional guarantees 
contained in the Bill of Rights merely because the decisions of Congress to intervene into the affairs 
of the people are, through their representatives, the decisions of the people themselves. Moreover, once 
the Constitution was amended to provide for the direct election of senators, U.S. CONST. amend. XVll, 
it was no longer plausible to argue that the interests of states qua states were represented in the U.S. 
Senate. 
" Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
"' 485 u.s. 505 (1988). 
•• /d. at 512. 
92 Freilich & Richardson, supra note 92, at 215. 
93 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (ReliDquist, J., dissenting). 
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2. Reinvigoration 
Justice Rehnquist was right; reports of the Tenth Amendment's demise 
were exaggerated. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court reversed course and 
began to reassert the importance of state sovereignty in the federal system. 
The Printz decision is only the most recent of several cases that have 
reaffirmed the principles of federalism and restricted the power of the 
federal government over state and local matters, the most important of 
which are New York v. United States94 and United States v. Lopez.95 
These three decisions are evidence that the Court is once again taking 
seriously the concept of "dual sovereignty," and will not leave the protec-
tion of state autonomy to the vagaries of the legislative process. 
a. New York v. United States 
In 1992, the Supreme Court voided portions of the Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.% Congress enacted the 
Waste Policy Amendments to ensure that every state developed adequate 
disposal for low-level radioactive waste, such as that generated by hospitals, 
research labs, and nuclear power plants. It did this by: (a) providing 
monetary incentives in the form of subsidies and surcharges on waste 
disposal; (b) authorizing states to block the import of waste from other 
states; and (c) requiring states with inadequate disposal capacit<; to take title 
to, and assume liability for, low-level radioactive waste generated within the 
state. The Court invalidated the last of these policies due to its coercive 
nature, holding that "while Congress has substantial power under the 
Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the 
radioactive waste generated within their borders, the Constitution does not 
confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so."97 
Despite the Court's prior holdings in Garcia and Baker, the majority held 
that "the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress 
the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' in-
94 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
9
' 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Other recent Supreme Court cases reinforcing federalism include: City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct 2157 (1997) (holding that the Supreme Court, not the Congress, 
determines the scope of Congress' enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding Congress lacks the authority 
to abrogate states Eleventh Amendment immunity from liability); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 
U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that historic State police powers will not be superseded by federal law 
without explicit evidence of Congressional intent to do so); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 542 (1991) 
(upholding state constitution's mandatory retirement age for judges). 
96 Pub. L. No. 99-240 (1985) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021-202lb (1994)). 
97 New York, 505 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added). 
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structions."98 To hold otherwise would be to reject the idea that the states 
themselves retain substantial sovereignty within the federal system. 
The Court's holding laid out simple ground rules for federal efforts to 
enlist state assistance in regulatory programs: "The Constitution enables the 
Federal Governme~t to pre-empt state regulation contrary to federal in-
terests, and it permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to the 
States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory 
schemes. It does not, however, authorize Congress simply to direct the 
States" to adopt Congress' policy prescriptions.99 "Whatever the outer 
limits of [state] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal Govern-
ment may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory 
program."100 
New York did not eviscerate Congress' ability to regulate interstate 
commerce or rely upon the states to fulfill national policy goals, it merely 
proscribed the methods Congress may use. If Congress is unwilling to 
instruct the federal executive to regulate directly, it still may seek to 
encourage state participation in a federal scheme. 101 The most obvious 
means of accomplishing this is to offer funds to the states with conditions 
attached, or to threaten to cut off an existing funding stream if set condi-
tions are not met.102 Such encouragement has significant force, but it also 
has limits. The Court held that "[s]uch conditions must ... bear some 
relationship to the purpose of the federal spending; otherwise, of course, the 
spending power could render academic the Constitution's. other grants and 
limits of federal authority."103 Under New York, Congress may also give 
states the choice of either implementing a program that complies with 
federal guidelines or accepting federal preemption of the state program by 
a federally administered one. This latter approach is "cooperative federal-
ism."104 
Thus, while New York did not impose substantive restraints upon 
Congress' power, it did place structural impediments to the enactment of 
laws that would excessively intrude into states' sovereign realms, and 
thereby threaten individual liberty. The Court made explicit that "[t]he 
98 /d. at 162. Justice O'Connor found support for her opinion in lhe language of Hodel concluding 
that Congress cannot "commandeer lhe legislative processes of lhe Stales by directly compelling lhem 
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." /d. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
99 ld. at 188. 
1110 /d. 
101 The Court noled lhat lhere are "a variety of melhods, short of outtight coercion, by which 
Congress may urge a Stale to adopt a legislative program consislent wilh federal inlerests." /d. at 167. 
"" "[U]nder Congress' spending power 'Congress may attach conditions on lhe receipt of federal 
funds."' /d. (citing Soulh Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,206 (1987)). 
103 /d. at 167 (citations omitted). 
104 /d.; see also supra Part I.A.l. 
588 GEO. MASON L. REV. [Vol. 6:3 
Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the 
States or state governments as abstract political entities . . . . To the 
contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state 
governments for the protection of individuals."105 
b. United States v. Lopez 
Constitutional inquiries as to whether given sovereign powers were 
granted to the federal government under the Constitution or retained by the 
States are "mirror images" of the same question.106 "If a power is delegat-
ed to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly 
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an 
attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is 
necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress."107 
Thus, Supreme Court holdings on the extent of Congress' Commerce 
Clause. power are central to any federalism inquiry, particularly in those few 
cases in which they serve to limit Congress' authority. 
In 1995, the Supreme Court explicitly limited Congress' Commerce 
Clause power for the first time in over fifty years. In United States v. 
Lopez, the Court held that the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1990 "neither 
regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the posses-
sion be connected in any way to interstate commerce," and therefore 
exceeded Congress' power "to regulate Commerce."108 The Court based its 
decision on a three-part test to determine whether regulating a given activity 
falls within Congress' power to regulate commerce. Under this test, Con-
gress may regulate the "channels of interstate cmmnerce" a.>Jd their use, the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and those activities that 
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. 109 Possession of a gun in a 
school zone failed to meet this test, even if that gun had traveled in 
interstate commerce. 
Insofar as the Court fmds limitations on the authority to regulate 
matters of state or local concern, it reinforces the "dual sovereignty" of the 
federal system. 110 This point was made explicit in Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence: "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of 
entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the 
regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of 
IDS fd. at 18J. 
106 ld. at 156. 
107 ld. 
108 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
109 ld. at 558-59. 
110 A federal statute that intrudes into state and local matters ''forecloses the States from 
experimenting and exercising their own judgment" ld. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would 
become illusory."111 The majority also recalled that in NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel-at the height of the Court's expansive Commerce Clause 
interpretation-the Court had declared that the clause should be interpreted 
"in the light of our dual system of government."112 To hold otherwise 
"would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is national and 
what is local and create a completely centralized government."113 A plena-
ry Commerce Clause power would completely eviscerate the governmental 
design that the founders sought to create. Thus, the Court recognized that 
Congress' Commerce Clause power could not operate without constraint if 
federalism is to be a meaningful safeguard of liberty. 
ll. PRINIZ V. UNITED STATES 
Taken together, New York and Lopez made clear that state sovereignty 
is more than an abstract notion-it is a substantive constraint upon federal 
power that a majority on the Supreme Court will enforce. Congress can 
neither regulate that which is beyond its power nor coerce states into 
enacting regulatory programs that Congress would prefer not to enact 
itself.114 However, neither case explicitly addressed the question of wheth-
er Congress could commandeer state officials. If so, Congress could evade 
the limitations imposed by Lopez and New York and federalism's revival 
would end before it had scarcely begun. Printz directly addressed this issue. 
A. Facts 
In 1993, Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968115 to im.: 
pose a background check and temporary waiting period on buyers of 
handguns. 116 This measure, called the Brady Act, 117 imposes a five-day 
"' ld. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
112 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
113 Jd. at 37. Justice O'Connor made a similar point dissenting in Garcia: "If stale autonomy is 
ignored in assessing the means by which Congress regulates matters affecting commerce, then 
federalism becomes irrelevant simply because the set of activities remaining beyond the reach of such 
a commerce power 'may well be negligible."' Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528, 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
114 See supra Part I.B.2. 
"' Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925 
(1994)). 
116 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s). 
117 Proponents of a waiting period for handgun purchases named the Act after former White House 
press secretary James Brady, who was shot and seriously injured when John Hinckley attempted to 
assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1981. Proponents argued that had there been a waiting period 
and/or background check in place, Hinckley would have been unable to purchase the gun with which 
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waiting period on the purchase of handguns. 118 During this period, the 
local chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) must "make a reasonable 
effort" to conduct a background check of relevant state, local and national 
records to determine whether the handgun purchase "would be in violation 
of the law, including research in whatever state and local record-keeping 
systems are available and in a national system designated by the Attorney 
General."119 If the purchaser may buy the gun, the CLEO must destroy the 
information gathered for the background check within twenty days!20 If 
the purchaser may not buy the gun, then the CLEO must provide a written 
explanation to the prospective handgun purchaser. 121 The law also enables 
individuals wrongfully barred from purchasing a handgun to sue "the State 
or political subdivision responsible . . . for denying the transfer"122 and 
provides criminal sanctions for violating the Brady Act's provisions.123 
Although the federal government claimed that the Brady Act merely 
required local officials "to give modest assistance in the implementation of 
the federal regulation of gun transfers" for a temporary period of time, 124 
the district court, as the fmder of fact, concluded that the CLEOs' obliga-
he shot Reagan and Brady. For example, upon first introducing the Brady bill in the Senate, Senator 
Howard Metzenbaum quoted James Brady's wife, Sarah Brady, who argued that "[h]ad a waiting 
period and background check for purchasers been in effect, John Hinckley could have been stopped." 
133 CONG. REc. SI792 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). 
'
18 Under the terms of the Act, the waiting period would expire in 1999 at which time an instant 
computer background check would be required for all gun sales. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(l)(A). A 
waiting period is not required in states where an instant computer background check is already 
operational. 
119 ld. § 922(s)(2). Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), a person is prohibited from purchasing or possessing 
a firearm: 
(I) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year; (2) who is a fugitive from justice; (3) who is an unlawful user of or 
addicted to any controlled substance ... ; (4) who has !J<>..en adjudicated as a mental defective 
or who has been committed to a mental institution; (5) who, being an alien, is illegally or 
unlawfully in the United States; (6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under 
dishonorable conditions; (7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced 
his citizenship; or (8) who is subject to a [restraining order in a domestic dispute] .... 
120 See id. § 922(s)(6)(B)(i). 
121 See id. § 922(s)(6)(C). 
122 ld. § 925. Despite its explicit language, this provision would only affect political subdivisions, 
such as municipalities, as the Supreme Court has held that Congress lacks the power to abrogate States' 
immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, See Seminole Tribe of Aorida v. Aorida, 116 S. 
CL 1114 (1996). Also note that under § 922(s)(7), CLEOs are not liable for failing to prevent the 
unlawful purchase of a handgun or the wrongful prevention of a handgun sale. 
123 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5). "[A]lthough the Brady Act establishes criminal penalties for 
knowing violations of the Act . . . the Department of Justice has concluded that those criminal 
sanctions do not apply to CLEOs who fail to abide by section 922(s)(2)." Brief for the United States 
at 6, Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct 2365 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478 and 95-1503). Despite the Justice 
Department's conclusion, the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms officials maintained 
that "the criminal penalties certainly could be applied to CLEOs" who fail to perform background 
checks. Petitioner's Brief at II, Printz (No. 95-1478). 
124 Brief for the United States at 10, Printz (Nos. 95-1478 and 95-1503). 
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tions under the Brady Act were "far from de minimis."125 According to the 
court, "[t]he ascertainment/background check is most burdensome."126 For 
a CLEO to check for an of the possible disqualifications for a gun pur-
chase, he would have to examine numerous databases, some by hand.127 
Due to the burdens imposed by the Brady Act, Jay Printz, sheriff and 
coroner for Ravalli County, Montana, filed a suit alleging that the law 
violated the Tenth Amendment by commandeering local officials to 
implement a federal regulatory program. A similar challenge to the Brady 
Act was filed in an Arizona federal district court by Graham County Sheriff 
Richard Mack. 128 
Both district courts held section 922(s) of the Brady Act to be uncon-
stitutional under the Tenth Amendment, enjoined the enforcement of that 
section, and upheld the remainder of the Act. 129 On appeal, the two cases 
were heard together by the Ninth Circuit, which upheld the mandatory 
background check in a 2-1 opinion.130 
B. Summary ofPrintz Opinion 
The Supreme Court held that the mandatory background check 
provisions of the Brady Act were unconstitutional infringements upon state 
sovereignty.131 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, and was joined 
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. 132 
Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter dissented. The lineup and 
opi.Jions echoed iJiOse in New York v. United States; 133 only justice Souter 
switched sides. In a separate dissenting opinion, he explicitly argued, that 
125 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1517 (D. Mont 1994). 
126 /d. 
127 Sheriff Printz provided undisputed evidence at trial that to fulfill the Brady Act a CLEO would 
have to search the National Crime Information Center database, the Criminal Justice Information 
Network, state hospital records, county court civil records, veteran's hospital records, misdemeanor 
court records and medical and drug treatment records. Not all of these records can be searched by com-
puter, and some are stored several hours drive from Ravalli County where Sheriff Printz works. Thus, 
Printz maintained, "[a] background check might require anywhere between an hour and several days." 
Petitioner's Brief at 4, Printz (No. 95-1478). 
128 See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994)_. Four other challenges were also 
filed in federal court around the country, but these were not consolidated for review by the Supreme 
Court See Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076 (W.O. La. 1995); McGee v. United States, 863 
F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D,.Vt 1994); Koog v. 
United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994). 
129 See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. 
Supp 1503 (D. Mont 1994). 
130 See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995). 
131 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct 2365 (1997). 
132 Justices O'Counor and Thomas joined the majority opinion but also wrote separate con-
currences. See id. at 2385. 
I3J 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
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the result in New York was consistent with upholding the Brady Act back-
ground check.134 
1. Majority Opinion 
The issue in Printz was an extension of that in New York. In New 
York, the Court invalidated the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments through which Congress sought to compel the 
states to implement a federal program through legislative action. With the 
Brady Act, Congress bypassed the state legislature and sought "to direct 
state law enforcement officers to participate, albeit only temporarily, in the 
administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme."135 The Brady 
Act used a less direct means of achieving its end than had the Waste Policy 
Amendments. However, as a practical matter, fmding for the federal 
government in either case would give Congress the ability to conscript state 
governments for federal causes. 
Rather than rest the holding squarely on the shoulders of the New York 
opinion-note that prudentially the cases presented the same fundamental 
issue-the Printz majority sought to expand the rationale for limiting the 
federal government's ability to command state governments for federal 
purposes. "The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring 
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, 
or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program," the Court held, 136 concluding that "such commands 
are fundamentally h1compatible wiih our constitutional system of dual 
sovereignty. "137 
Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority was not based upon a close 
reading of constitutional text; "there is no constitutional text speaking to 
this precise question."138 Rather, the majority rested its decision on a 
tripartite analysis of (1) historical understanding of the Constitution; (2) the 
Constitution's structure; and (3) prior Supreme Court jurisprudence.139 
134 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2401 (Souter, J ., dissenting). Justice Breyer also authored a dissent 
that Stevens joined. See id. at 2404 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
m !d. at 2369. 
136 !d. at 2384. 
137 /d. 
138 !d. at 2370. 
"
9 
"Because there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the 
CLEO's challenge must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the 
Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court." I d. 
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a. Historica1 Understanding 
The majority's first argument is the least compelling. The historica1 
record on the question presented to the Court in the Brady Act is ambigu-
ous, and there is a strong argument that the Founders were unafraid of 
a1lowing Congress to conscript state and loca1 magistrates. 140 To identify 
the historica1 understanding of the federa1-state relationship, Justice Scalia 
examined sources contemporaneous with the writing of the Constitution, 
giving particular weight to the character of the enactments of the early 
Congresses. 141 Justice Sca1ia noted that there were no statutes in the early 
Congresses explicitly ca11ing upon state executives to implement federa1 
programs. However, there are statutes in which Congress requested states' 
voluntary acquiescence to federal goa1s. For example, Justice Scalia pointed 
out that on September 23, 1789-one day before the enactment of the Tenth 
Amendment-the very first Congress enacted a law providing for federa1 
prisoners to be held in state jails at federa1 expense. 142 This law did not 
command states to acquiesce to federa1 instruction. Instead, it merely 
recommended that the legislatures instruct jailkeepers to keep federa1 
prisoners and offered to compensate states for their actions. Not a11 states 
complied with Congress' request. Georgia, for one, refused. But rather than 
compel Georgia to comply with the federa1 program, Congress instead 
authorized federa1 marsha1s to rent jail space until the federa1 government 
constructed or otherwise acquired permanent jails. 143 
The Court concluded that "there is not only an absence of executive-
comtuandeef..ng statutes in the early Congresses, but LlJere is an absence of 
them in our later history as well."144 The only exception to this genera] 
proposition was a handful of recent statutes identified by the dissent. 145 · 
140 See infra note 172, 214. 
141 Although the actions of early Congresses are not dispositive, "such 'contemporaneous 
legislative exposition of the Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the 
construction to be given its provisions."' Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2370 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 
u.s. 52, 175 (1926)). 
142 See id. at 2372 (citing Act of Sept 23, 1789, 1 Stat 96). 
143 See id. The dissent argues correctly that the mere fact that Congress never exercised a duty is 
no reason to presume that the duty does not exist However, long-standing historical practice should 
inform congressional interpretation. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government 
cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply 
them." /d. at 610. 
144 Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2375. 
145 See id. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The statutes include 40 Stat 80-1 (registration of 
young adults for the draft), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001, 11003 (1994) (creation of response commissions for 
release of hazardous substances), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a (data collection and reporting on underground 
storage tanks), 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1994) (reporting traffic fatalities), and 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) 
(reporting missing children). The decision's impact on the two environmental programs on this list is 
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Other courts have independently arrived at the same conclusion when faced 
with a similar question. 146 
Justice Scalia readily acknowledged that in the founding period 
Congress instructed state courts to perform a variety of functions, such as 
recording applications of citizenship and registering aliens.147 However, 
Justice Scalia argued that "[t]hese early laws establish, at most" that 
Congress could impose obligations on state judges "related to matters 
appropriate for the judicial power."148 Justice Scalia explicitly rejected the 
argument that "early statutes imposing obligations on state courts imply a 
power of Congress to impress the state executive into its service,"149 
noting that while there are many statutes imposing duties on the judiciary, 
there is an "utter lack of statutes" imposing similar duties on state execu-
tives.150 
The majority also questioned the federal government's (and the 
dissent's) reliance on The Federalist Papers to support the claim that the 
Framers intended to allow the federal government to coerce state and local 
officials to fulfill federal policies.151 To the majority, discussions by Alex-
ander Hamilton or others about the use of state officials as tax collectors or 
other federal servants "appear to rest on the natural assumption that the 
States would consent to allowing their officials to assist the Federal Govern-
ment ... ,"152 recalling that the early Congresses did not conscript state 
officials, and instead relied upon their cooperation or goodwill. 153 Hamil-
ton may have called for the use of state and government officials in seeking 
discussed infra Part ill.B. 
'
46 See Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 841 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Federal law often says to the states, 
'Don't do any of these things,' leaving outside the scope of its prohibition a wide range of alternative 
courses of action. But it is illuminating to observe how rai-ely it says, 'Do This thing,' leaving no 
choice but to go ahead and do it"). 
147 See Printz, l17 S. Ct at 2370. Justice Scalia also cited evidence suggesting that this require-
ment may have "applied only in States that authorized their courts to conduct naturalization proceed-
ings." /d. 
148 !d. at 2371. 
149 ld. 
ISO Jd. 
151 For example, Alexander Hamilton wrote in THE FEDERALIST that the federal government "must 
stand in need of no intermediate legislations, but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the 
ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions." THE FEDERALIST No. 16, at 154 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Also, in THE FEDERALIST No. 27, Hamilton wrote that the 
Constitution would "enable the [federal] government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each [state] 
in the execution of its laws." THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick 
ed., 1987). However, Hamilton also noted that there were those who feared this would "tend to the 
destruction of the State governments." /d. at 204 n.37. 
152 Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2372. 
153 See id. at 2373. The majority also points out that the language in THE FEDERALIST No. 27 
relied upon by Justice Souter in his dissent would seem to include state legislatures, and not just 
executives, thereby undermining Souter and the majority's support for the holding of New York. See 
id. at 2373 & n.S. 
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to ensure the Constitution's ratification by New York, but that did not mean 
that the rest of the. Framers concurred. In sum, the historical evidence is 
suggestive, but "not conclusive."154 
b. Constitutional Structure 
A more compelling justification for the Printz decision is that "the 
Constitution established a system of 'dual sovereignty,"'155 that "is reflect-
ed throughout the Constitution's text."156 The federal government has 
power over the states in particular realms, but states nonetheless maintain 
a sphere of sovereignty that is "inviolable."157 This residual sovereignty is 
"implicit" in the Constitution's delegation of "discrete, enumerated" powers 
in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment's 
explicit charge that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, 
respectively, or to the people."158 As the Court held in New York, while 
the language of the Amendment is tautological, "the Tenth Amendment 
confmns that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that 
may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States."159 
Accepting the states as sovereign units within the federal system 
compels the conclusion that there must be some limits upon the federal 
government's power over state matters.160 "The power of the Federal 
Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress 
into its service-and at no cost to itself-the police officers of the 50 
154 /d. at 2376. 
155 /d. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)). 
156 /d. Among the exa;nples identified by Justice Scalia are "the prohibition on a11y involuntary 
reduction or combination of a State's territory" contained in Article IV, § 3, and the Amendment 
process contained in Article V. /d. 
157 THE FEoERAUST No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). For Madison, 
the country has "a federal and not a national constitution" in that "[e]ach State, in ratifying the 
Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body." /d. at 257 (emphasis in original). 
1
"' Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2376-77. 
159 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). The opinion continues: ''The Tenth 
Amendment thus directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is 
protected by a limitation on an Article I power." /d. 
160 Historically such limits may have been explicitly contained in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. 
However, the expansion of congressional powers under the Commerce Clause has undermined Article 
I, § 8 as an independent limitation on federal intrusions upon state sovereignty, the Court's recent 
Lopez decision notwithstanding: 
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to 
the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any 
government would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have 
believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibili-
ties. 
/d. at 157. 
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states."161 This would fundamentally disrupt the system of dual sovereign-
ty that the Founders sought to create, and compromise the "double securi-
ty"162 that it is intended to preserve. As the Court held previously, "[t]he 
preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as 
much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of 
the Union and the maintenance of the National government."163 
Justice Scalia's majority opinion drew upon the historical discussion of 
the Constitution's structure that was central to Justice O'Connor's opinion 
in New York. 164 O'Connor pointed out that during the debate over the 
Constitution, the Framers considered two models of federal power. Under 
the first, proposed by the New Jersey delegation, the federal government 
would have the power to command the states and act through them to 
achieve national goals. It could not, however, act directly upon the people. 
An alternative plan was put forward by Edmund Randolph that would 
empower the federal government to authorize "national Legislation over 
individuals."165 Under O'Connor's reading, these two options-authorizing 
legislative power over states or individuals-were two separate options, and 
the Founders opted for the latter.166 The alternative of "a sovereignty over 
sovereigns" was, to James Madison, "a solecism in theory" and "in prac-
tice ... subversive of the order and ends of [a] civil polity."167 
Whereas the dissent argued that the power to commandeer state 
officials for federal purposes is a "necessary and proper" exercise of the 
Commerce Clause power under Article I, Section 8, the majority relied 
upon New York's holding that "even where the Congress has the authority 
161 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378. 
162 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). "Just as the 
separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and 
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory, 501 
U.S. at 458. 
163 Texas v. While, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869). 
164 See New York, 505 U.S. at 164-65. 
165 1 REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 255-56 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
166 
"The Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate 
individuals, not States." New York, 505 U.S. at 166. O'Connor noles that in making the case for the 
Virginia Plan, Randolph argued that "[t]here are but two modes, by which the end of a General 
Governn~ent can be attained," suggesting a dichotomy of two discrete options. ld. at 164. Massachu-
setts delegate Rufus King also explained his support for a new Constitution by stating, "[l]aws, to be 
effective, therefore, must not be laid on states, but upon individuals." ld. at 165 (citing 2 JONATHAN 
ELuOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 56 (2d ed. 1863) (emphasis added)). The dissent 
argues that the two plans were not dichotomous and that the debate was instead over whether to give 
the federal governnient additional power, as opposed to power of a different sort. "The basic change 
in the character of the government that the Framers conceived was designed to enhance the power of 
the national government, not to provide some new, unmentioned inununity for state officers." Printz, 
117 S. Ct. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
167 THE F'EDERAUST No. 20, at 172 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
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under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it 
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those 
acts."168 Thus, while the majority accepted Congress' ability to regulate 
the sale and transfer of handguns, it rejected Congress' ability to require 
that states impose the same regulations.169 
A fmal structural argument made by the majority is that the Brady Act 
effectively transfers the Executive's power to execute the nation's laws to 
municipal officers in the various states, and thereby undermines the "unity 
in the Federal Executive.'mo The Constitution explicitly vests "the execu-
tive Power" in the President and states the President "shall take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed."171 Executing and enforcing federal law 
is the obligation of the executive branch, not that of the states. 
c. Prior Court Holdings 
The last and most conclusive element in the majority opinion is its 
reliance on prior Supreme Court jurisprudence. However much the dissent 
takes issue with the majority's historical interpretations or structural argu-
ments-some of which are certainly open to debate172-it is difficult to 
argue against the outcome of Printz given the holdings of New York and 
other recent federalism cases.173 Upholding the background check pro-
vision of the Brady Act would effectively nullify the Court's ruling in New 
168 New York, 505 U.S. at 166. 
169 This claim is distinguished from the holdings in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982). 
See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. 
It should also be noted that while the majority opinion accepted Congress' power to regulate the 
intrastate transfer of firearms, Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, expressed his self-described 
"revisionist" view that Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause are far more circumscribed than 
recent Court decisions would suggest. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring): 
Even if we construe Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce to encompass those 
intrastate transactions that "substantially affect" interstate commerce, I question whether 
Congress can regulate the particular transactions at issue here. The Constitution, in addition 
to delegating certain enumerated powers to Congress, places whole areas outside the reach 
of Congress' regulatory authority. 
Thomas goes on to raise the possibility that a "colorable argument exists" that the Brady Act also 
infringes upon the Second Amendment to the Constitution. I d. at 2386. 
170 Id. at 2378. Concern for the unitary executive is a common theme in Justice Scalia's opinions. 
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
171 u.s. CoNST. art. n, §§ 1, 3 (emphasis added). 
m See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer 
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995); Saikrishna Bangalore 
Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (arguing that Congress may comman-
deer state judicial and executive officials, but not legislatures). 
173 Indeed, only Justice Souter argued that the Court could uphold the Brady Act background 
check without disturbing the holding in New York. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). 
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York, reducing the constitutional protection of state sovereignty from 
congressional overreach to an empty, formalistic doctrine. 
Justice Scalia notes that the first cases directly addressing the question 
as to whether the federal government could commandeer state officers arose 
in the 1970s, when several states and the District of Columbia challenged 
the Environmental Protection Agency's implementation of the Clean Air 
Act. The EPA lost in three of four circuit courts.174 One court remarked 
that the idea that the federal government could command states to imple-
ment specific regulations was "clearly inconsistent with the history of our 
federal structure."175 The Supreme Court never ruled on this question 
because the EPA withdrew the affected regulations after the Court had 
granted certiorari, rendering the case moot.176 
When the Supreme Court fmally had the opportunity to address the 
question of whether Congress could commandeer the states to implement 
federal programs, it answered in the negative. "Where a federal interest is 
sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it 
may not conscript state governments as its agents. "m Not only do such 
actions compromise the federal structure inherent in the Constitution, they 
also undermine accountability of government at both the state and local 
level; "where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may 
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the 
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated 
from the electoral ramifications of their decision."178 Whereas the New 
York opinion overturned a congressional attempt to conscript state legisla-
tures to enact specific programs, the Printz majority simply extended the 
argument of New York to cover federal efforts to conscript state-level 
executive power. 179 This was contemplated in the New York opinion: "The 
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program."180 
The ruling in New York, although the first to address directly the 
174 The EPA's regulations were invalidated on constitutional and statutory grounds by the D.C. 
CircuiL See District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits raised doubts about the constitutionality of the EPA's regulations, but opted to invalidate them 
on statutory grounds. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 
(9th Cir. 1975). Similar regulations were upheld by the Third CircuiL Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 
246 (3d Cir. 1974). See infra Part ill.C. Of course, unreviewed precedents of circuit courts would in 
no way bind the Supreme Court to follow suiL 
m Brown, 521 F.2d at 838. 
17
' See EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). 
m New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992). 
'" ld. at 169. 
179 Had the Court held otherwise, it would have effectively emasculated the power of the New 
York holding as Congress would simply conscript state officials directly in every instance, and bypass 
the legislature. See infra Part II.C. 
180 New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added). 
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question of federal commandeering of state governments, had been fore-
shadowed in the Court's prior cases. For instance, in Hodel, the Court ruled 
that the federal government may not "commandeer the legislative processes 
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program."181 Similarly, in FERC v. Mississippi the Court noted 
that it "never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to 
promulgate and enforce laws and regulations."182 While both Hodel and 
FERC v. Mississippi upheld the statutes in question, this was because 
neither law directly compelled state regulatory action.183 Thus, Justice 
Scalia wrote, the opinion in New York "should have come as no sur-
prise."Js4 
Justice Scalia was also careful to distinguish the ruling in Garcia from 
that in Printz. The challenge to the Brady Act did not call upon the Court 
to determine "whether the incidental application to the States of a federal 
law of general applicability excessively interfered with the functioning of 
state governments" because "it is the whole object of the law to direct the 
functioning of the state executive."185 The primary distinction is between 
a federal law that seeks to direct the actions of states qua states and that 
which imposes upon states because it directs all entities-public and 
private-to adhere to a federally determined standard, such as a minimum 
wage.186 Thus, Printz and Garcia implicate two different aspects of feder-
alism, and the invalidation of a federal enactment in the former need not 
interfere with the holding in the latter.187 
2. The Dissents 
Whereas the majority explicitly relied upon the Court's holding in New 
York, the dissent penned by Justice Stevens ("dissent"), claimed that the 
challenges to the Brady Act did not "implicate the more difficult 
questions ... addressed in New York."188 Rather, the dissent posited that 
the case presented the more narrow question "whether Congress, acting on 
181 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
182 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1982). 
183 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380. 
184 ld. 
185 ld. at 2383. 
186 This distinction was noted in New York, 505 U.S. at 160. 
187 Justice Stevens acknowledges the distinction, and its grounding in precedent, although he finds 
it unpersuasive. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2397 (Stevens, -J., dissenting) ("[f)he Court does not disturb 
the conclusion that flows directly from our prior holdings that the burden on police officers would be 
permissible if a similar burden were also imposed on private parties with access to relevant data .... 
• A. structural problem !:!>..at vanishes when the statute affects private individuals as well as public officials 
is not much of a structural problem.''). 
188 Id. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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behalf of the people . . . may require local law enforcement officers to 
perform certain duties during the interim needed for the development of a 
federal gun control program."189 Playing off the majority's admission that 
the constitutional text was insufficient to render the Brady Act unconstitu-
tional, the dissent declared, "[t]here is not a clause, sentence, or paragraph 
in the entire text of the Constitution . . . that supports the proposition that 
a local police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted 
by Congress pursuant to an express delegation of power enumerated in 
Article 1."190 Furthermore, the dissent noted that Congress merely imposed 
temporary burdens on CLEOs to address an "epidemic of gun violence. " 191 
Whereas the majority did not explicitly rely upon the Constitution's 
text to resolve the issue, the dissent held that the Constitution's text 
"provides a sufficient basis for a correct disposition of this case. "192 Be-
cause Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to regulate the sale and 
transfer of handguns through the Commerce Clause, and because the 
Constitution further grants Congress the power "to make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
powers,"193 Congress has "ample authority" to conscript CLEOs to enforce 
the Brady Act's background check provisions.194 The dissent explicitly 
rejected the argument that the Tenth Amendment imposes any limitations on 
congressional power not already implicit in Article I, 195 and argued that, 
if anything, "federal law may impose greater duties on state officials than 
on private citizens" because all government officials must take an oath to 
support the Constitution.1% 
The dissent also responded to each prong of the majority opinion's 
tripartite analysis. Whereas Justice O'Connor held in New York that the 
Frarners sought to give the federal goveunnent the power to directiy 
regulate individuals instead of the federal power to regulate states under the 
Articles of Confederation, Justice Stevens argued this power was given to 
IB9 /d. 
190 !d. at 2389. 
191 !d. at 2387 (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at 8 (1993)). The dissent also notes that, in its 
estimation, the mandatory background check has been a "remarkable success." /d. Of course, the 
utilitarian value of mandated background checks, even if accepted, does not speak to the constitutional-
ity of requiring CLEOs to administer them, even if only for a brief time. 
192 !d. 
193 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
194 Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
195 Indeed, the dissent quotes from New York that "in a case ... involving the division of authority 
between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other" to suggest 
there is no substantive content to the Tenth Amendment /d. at 2388 (citing New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)). Of course, this view implies that the Tenth Amendment was a waste of ink 
and parchment 
196 !d. (citing U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 3). The dissent also notes that the Supremacy Clause in 
Article VI establishes federal law as "the supreme law of the land." /d. 
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the federal government in addition to the power to regulate states.197 In 
support of this claim, Justice Stevens cited Alexander Hamilton, who wrote 
that the Constitution, "by extending the authority of the federal head to the 
individual citizens of the several States, will enable the government to 
employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws."198 
In particular, Hamilton argued that the federal government would rely upon 
state officers and state regulations for the collection of taxes.199 
That early Congresses rarely, if ever, exercised their authority to 
commandeer state officials is no "argument against its existence," the 
dissent noted.200 For instance, simply because President Woodrow Wilson 
requested state action to implement the draft during World War I, rather 
than demanding it, does not mean Wilson could not have issued the 
command had he wanted to do so.201 Justice Stevens also relied upon the 
research of Evan Caminkerm to argue that the federal government did 
impose duties upon state judges and clerks, if not executive officers them-
selves, and that some of the functions state judges performed could argu-
ably be characterized as executive in nature.203 . 
On the matter of constitutional structure, the dissent sought to resurrect 
the Garcia Court's argument that the structural safeguards preventing 
federal infringements upon state sovereignty are purely political and do not 
require judicial review of congressional enactments. In Garcia, the Court 
held that "[t]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of 
the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Govern-
ment itself."204 In other words, because the states have political clout, it 
should be presumed L'lat Congress adequately considered tlJe concerns of 
197 
"The basic change in the character of the government that the Framers conceived was designed 
to enhance the power of the national government, not to provide some new, unmentioned immunity for 
state officers." ld. at 2389. 
198 THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Hamilton 
then proceeds to explain that this power "Will give the federal government the same advantage for 
securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State." Id. 
199 See THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 238 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Though 
it is unclear whether the federal government ever availed itself of this power. 
200 Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Of course it should be noted that this 
argument suggests that there is nothing inherently suspect about an unprecedented exercise of federal 
power, a presumption that the majority opinion clearly does not share. 
"'' See id. at 2393. 
202 See Caminker, supra note 172. 
"" See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2392 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority maintained that the 
conscription of the state judiciaries is a wholly separate matter from the conscription of executive 
officials and legislatures, and that the actions performed by state judges pursuant to federal Jaw were 
"quintessentially adjudicative tasks." I d. at 2372 n.2. The dissent responded that this is a "functional," 
as opposed to "formalistic," assessment of the judges' actions which suggests the federal government 
was commandeering state officers for executive functions even if it was not commandeering executive 
officials. I d. at 2392. 
204 Garcia v. San Antonio lvfetro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985). 
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states before imposing obligations upon them/05 even if senators are no 
longer directly elected by their respective state legislatures. The dissent 
cited the recent passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995206 
in support of this view, though as discussed above, it is difficult to argue 
that passage of this law significantly advanced state concerns about the 
proliferation of unfunded mandates. 207 As a fmal structural argument, the 
dissent suggested that to curtail the federal government's ability to conscript 
states is to invite direct federal intervention into all sorts of local mat-
ters.208 
Faced with the precedent in New York, the dissent argued that the issue 
presented by the Brady Act is significantly narrower than that presented by 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985, and that the 
majority has chosen to rest its decision on dicta from the case.209 More-
over, Stevens argued that the other Supreme Court cases the majority cited 
favorably, such as Hodel and FERC v. Mississippi, authorized significantly 
greater intrusions upon state sovereignty than did the Brady Act.21° Final-
ly, the dissent suggested that the Court's 1947 decision in Testa v. Katf11 
requiring state courts to adjudicate claims brought under federal law should 
demonstrate the federal government's ability to commandeer state officials. 
Despite these assertions, it is clear from the dissent's historical and structur-
al arguments that its real complaint is not with the holding in Printz, but 
that in New York. 
"" The dissent reasoned that "[i]t is far more reasonable to presume that [Congress'] decisions to 
impose modest burdens on state officials from time to time reflect a considered judgment that the 
people in each of the States will benefit therefrom." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
For a review of environmental policies that are designed to advance narrow interests, as opposed to 
those of the nation as a whole, see Jonathan H. Adler, Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, REG., 
1996 No. 4, at 26 [hereinafter Adler, Rent-Seeking]. See also ENVIRONMENTAL Pouncs: PuBLIC 
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds., 1992). 
206 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 658-658d, 1501-1504). 
207 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2395 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, Stevens' claim that UMRA 
"meaningfully addressed" the problems caused by unfunded mandates suggests his unfamiliarity of the 
issue, if for no other reason than that UMRA was not retroactive and did nothing to relieve the burden 
of preexisting mandates, and imposes minimal burdens for the imposition of new ones. See supra Part 
I.A.2. 
2D8 See Printz, 111 S. Ct. at 2396 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). Given contemporary budget restraints 
and political resistance to new expansions of federal power, this argument rings hollow. More likely, 
the federal government would simply seek to regulate less, or enforce certain regulations more 
selectively. And even were the majority's decision to invite a swarm of federal officials to descend 
upon states and localities, there would be little doubt as to which level of government was responsible 
for the new generation of impositions, thereby addressing the concern with accountability that lies at 
the heart of both the Printz and New York opinions. 
"" See id. at 2398. 
210 See id. at 2399. While this may be true, in these two cases the federal government offered to 
preempt the states. The Brady Act did not provide for the federal government to assume the CLEOs' 
roles if they did not comply. 
211 330 u.s. 386 (1947). 
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Justice Souter both joined the Stevens dissent and penned another 
seeking to uphold both the Brady Act and the New York ruling, which he 
had joined.212 His opinion highlights the closeness of the Printz deci-
sion,213 as well as the tension between a functional and formalistic view 
of federal power. For instance, Souter noted that the early history is 
ambiguous, and sided with the dissent based upon his reading of The 
Federalist Papers:214 
Congress may not require a state legislature to enact a regulatory scheme .... 
But insofar as national law would require nothing from a state officer inconsis-
tent with the power proper to his branch of tripartite state goverrunent ... I 
suppose that the reach of federal law as Hamilton described it would not be 
exceeded. 215 
While Souter's argument has some historical basis/16 it creates a 
distinction that collapses in practice-at least when applied in a legal 
context which recognizes few substantive limits on congressional power. If 
a state enacts a regulatory scheme for one purpose, there is nothing to stop 
Congress from commandeering the state personnel hired for that purpose to 
administer some federal scheme. As far as the state is concerned, Congress 
might as well have conscripted the legislature in the first place, for it is left 
with no more sovereign ability to make policy and allocate resources than 
if it were a mere field office for the federal government. Perhaps recogniz-
ing this conundrum, Souter would limit Congress' power in this regard 
somewhat, by requiring that the federal government "pay fair value" for the 
state's efforts on t.he federal government's behalf.217 
212 Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, that provided a brief 
comparative analysis of federalism with other nations. 
213 Indeed, it is interesting to note that Souter found the case "closer than I had anticipated." 
Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter did "not find anything dispositive in the 
paucity of early examples of federal employment of state officers for executive purposes," nor would 
he "dissent with no more to go on than those few early instances in the administration of naturalization 
laws, for example, or such later instances as state support for federal emergency action." /d. at 2401. 
214 See id. at 2402. A strong originalist argument for Congress' ability to conscript state executive 
officials but not legislatures is laid out in Prakash, supra note 172. See also Caminker, supra note 172; 
H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 19 VA. L. REv. 633, 652-681 (1993). 
215 Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2404 (Souter, J., dissenting). On this point Souter is at odds with Stevens, 
and his separate dissent explicitly outlines the qualifications that he would add to Stevens' opinion. 
216 See generally Prakash, supra note 172. 
217 Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2404 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALisr No. 36). Souter 
would turn the unfunded mandate of the Brady Act into a funded one and remand the case due to 
Congress' failure to pay for the CLEOs' efforts. The issue Souter did not address is what occurs when 
state legislatures explicitly bar executive personnel from engaging in particular functions, such as a 
background check, but Congress would call upon them to perform it Such a situation, more likely to 
occur if Souter's view were the majority, would pit the autonomy of the state legislature squarely 
against the authority of Congress. 
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C. Discussion 
The essential holding of Printz was compelled by that of New York. A 
formalistic distinction between conscription of legislative and executive 
functions breaks down in practice, and would have emptied New York of its 
substance. To hire state troopers or any other officials, states must raise 
funds and pass authorizing legislation. This power is an essential element of 
the state legislature's independence. Insofar as the federal government 
commandeers these state employees for other functions, it prevents them 
from fulfilling the aims that the state legislature has set for them.218 Be-
cause the resources at any state or local government's disposal are limited, 
it can be no other way. 
The power of the purse, an inherently legislative function, cannot be 
separated from other aspects of legislative power. To allocate resources to 
a given priority is to make policy. Even advocates of federal power must 
concede that "[r]equiring local and state officials to implement federal 
controls represents a serious interference with local political self-determina-
tion. "219 When a legislature elects to spend more tax dollars on guns than 
butter (or vice-versa), it is making a policy judgment about the needs of its 
constituents. To commandeer the resources of a state or local government 
is to make policy for the conscripted government by denying the legislature 
the ability to make trade-offs. This is particularly true in the case of the 
Brady Act which imposed far more than mere "ministerial" burdens on 
CLEOs.220 
Federal efforts that conscript state or local officials for all but the most 
menial and insubstantial tasks force the legislature to reallocate resources 
and/or redefine its policy-making priorities.221 It enables the federal gov-
ernment to say, in effect, "it's swell, County X, that you think you need 50 
police officers to keep your homes and streets safe, but we're going to take 
half of the available person-hours to fulfill things that we, the Congress, 
feel are more important. (P.S. If you don't like it, get your citizens to vote 
us out of office.)" As Briffault explains, "[b]y crowding state agendas with 
federal programs, and pressuring states to commit their personnel, treasure, 
118 Imposing mandates on state and local governments "greatly reduce[s] the discretionary 
authority of local governments to make decisions and formulate policies, thus making the local 
governments less responsive to their citizens' needs." Freilich & Richardson, supra note 58, at 222. 
119 Stewart, supra note 41, at 1210. 
110 See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1517 (D. Mont 1994). However, the outcome 
of the case likely would have been no different, even if the impositions on Sheriff Printz were 
relatively minor. 
111 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor notes that the Court "appropriately refrain[ed] from 
deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congrp...ss on state a..r!d 
local governments ... are similarly invalid." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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and authority to federa1 concerns, these measures can limit the capacity of 
the states to pursue their own state-initiated programs."222 The end result 
is, in the words of the dissent, to "provide Congress the authority to require 
states to enact legislation-a power that affects States far closer to the core 
of their sovereign authority."223 In the majority's words: "to say that the 
Federa1 government cannot control the State, but can control all of its 
officers is to say nothing of significance."224 Insofar as the federa1 govern-
ment can conscript state officers in their officia1 capacity as agents of the 
state, it can effectively conscript the state itself.225 
In defending the Brady Act background check, the federal government 
had sought to ground the legislative-executive distinction in the idea that 
"the Brady Act does not require state legislative or executive officia1s to 
make policy, but instead issues a fma1 directive to state CLE0s."226 Yet 
this argument is no more successful at distinguishing the issues in Printz 
from those in New York. The Brady Act required that CLEOs make a "rea-
sonable effort" to conduct the background checks.227 According to the 
federa1 government, "since CLEOs themselves are in the 'best position to 
determine' what constitutes a 'reasonable effort,'" they will determine what 
level of law enforcement resources to devote to checking the records of 
prospective gun purchasers.228 Thus, the very language of the Brady Act, 
and the government's own description of the duties it imposed, imply a 
"policymaking" component to the actions of CLEOs: Should ten person-
hours-per-day be devoted to background checks or only three? Should 
officers be sent to the State Capitol to search relevant records or not? And 
so on. As the Court concluded, "[i]t is quite impossible ... to draw the 
Government's proposed line at 'no policymaking,' and we would have to 
fall back upon a line of 'not too much policymaking. "'229 "Executive 
action that has utterly no policymaking component is rare, particularly at an 
executive level as high as a jurisdiction's chief law-enforcement offi-
212 Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concepts in Contemporary 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1352 (1994). 
223 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2388 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
224 /d. at 2382. 
225 In the extreme, one can conceive of a federal law requiring the implementation of a massive 
federal scheme by state officers such that no state resources or personnel are available for state-
mandated functions. It may be extremely unlikely that Congress would enact federal mandates that 
severe, but putting the issue in such stark terms illustrates that allowing the conscription of state 
officers with impunity would effectively overrule the holding of New York. Moreover, the direct 
election of senators does significantly reduce the political barriers to imposing federal mandates at all. 
226 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380. 
227 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994). 
,. Brief for the United States at 6-7, Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (No: 95-1478). 
229 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381. "How much is too much is not likely to be answered precisely; and 
an imprecise barrier against federal intrusion upon state authority is not likely to be an effective one." 
/d. 
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cer."230 
The political accountability problems identified by the majority in 
Printz are identical to those raised in New York: "By forcing state govern-
ments to absorb the fmancial burden of implementing a federal regulatory 
program, Members of Congress can take credit for 'solving' problems 
without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher 
federal taxes. "231 State and local governments must absorb the costs and 
face whatever backlash results from implementing a burdensome or other-
wise locally unpopular program.232 This, too, undermines the structural 
balance the Framers sought to create: "The theory that two governments 
accord more liberty than one requires for its realization two distinct and 
discernible lines of political accountability: one between the citizens and the 
Federal Government; the second between the citizens and the States."233 
To argue that the Printz holding rests on New York only begs the 
question as to whether New York itself was properly decided.234 The 
majority and dissent present sharply divergent interpretations of constitu-
tional history and evidence of the Framers' intent, neither of which is 
dispositive. 
In the absence of a clear winner in the historical debate, the most 
viable argument for the Printz decision-and, by extension, the decision in 
New York-is that such limits on Congress' power are inherent within, or 
at least compelled by, the structure of the Constitution. For the Framers, the 
federal govermnent was to have very liwited power. ln such circumstances, 
whether those limited powers are used to enlist the states in various projects 
would be relatively immaterial, as the federal government could only do so 
much. Occasional commandeering, like the Commerce Clause itself, would 
pose little threat to the sovereignty of states .. 
The limited federal government that the Framers thought they had 
230 I d. The Court further noted: 
[A]ssuming ... that the Brady Act leaves no "policymaking" discretion with the States, we 
fail to see how that improves rather than worsens the intrusion upon state sovereignty. 
Preservation of the States as independent and autonomous political entities is arguably Jess 
undermined by requiring them to make policy in certain fields than ... by "reduc[ing] [them] 
to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress." 
ld. (citing Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
231 /d. at 2382. 
232 Compare this argument with- that in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) 
(arguing that federal mandates diminish accountability at both the state and federal level). 
233 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
234 There is of course another alternative: New York reached the right result through the wrong 
means. For example, the Court could arguably have held that the take title provisions under challenge 
violated the guarantee clause of the Constitution due to their imposition on state legislatures, thereby 
avoiding the thicket of jurisprudence on federal-state relationships. Of course, the distinction between 
federal efforts to conscript legislative and executive personnel is purely formalistic. To allow one and 
not the other is to make the initial prohibition a meaningless constraint on federal power. 
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created eventually gave way to a bloated regulatory-welfare state, as 
O'Connor noted: 
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been 
unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would 
not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and 
second, because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Govern-
ment, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities.235 
Even if one accepts the argument that the Framers intended for Congress to 
have the power to conscript executive officials, this power operated within 
a constitutional scheme which truly limited the scope of federal power.236 
Thus, the power to commandeer state officials would not have posed a 
significant threat to state sovereignty.237 
Over the past six decades, the expansion of Commerce Clause power 
has eroded state sovereignty, threatening to undermine the entire federal 
structure.238 If the enumeration of powers in Article I, Section 8 no longer 
serves to limit the scope of congressional power, the Court is faced with 
two choices: unearth enforceable limits on federal power from within the 
Constitution's structure, or acknowledge that the federal system envisioned 
by the Framers is gone. "[T]he core of federalism is the formal legal 
position of the states in the federal structure;"239 if that position is not 
protected, the structure disintegrates. 
The Court has long recognized this dilemma. Even as the Court 
aggrandized federal power during the New Deal, it recognized that an all-
powerful federal government "would effectually obliterate the distinction 
between what is national and what is local and create a completely central-
ized govemment."240 Therefore, the reinvigoration Of substantive Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence is necessary if the vestiges of federal structure 
are to be maintained.241 As Briffault notes, "[t]he role of the courts is to 
235 New York, 505 U.S. at 157. 
236 Moreover, until enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, senators were elected by 
the state legislatures, and were therefore more likely to defend the interests of states as states, rather 
than the broader political preferenCes of the state's citizens. 
237 However, Hamilton acknowledged in THE FEDERAliST No. 27 that some Framers Jlid envision 
such a threat. See THE FEDERAliST No. 27, at 204 n.37 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987). 
238 
"The Constitution does not protect the states from federal Jlisplacement even with respect to 
matters that historically were primarily fields of state competence, as recent Supreme Court decisions 
sustaining federal legislation in such traJlitional state fields as land use regulation, public utility regula-
tion, and alcoholic beverage consumption demonstrate." Briffault, supra note 222, at 1341 (citations 
omitted). 
239 ld. at 1352. 
240 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
241 The only alternative would be for the Court to resurrect pre-New Deal interpretations of the 
Commerce Clause. Yet, as shown in Lopez, there is only one justice that will even consider such a 
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protect the formal features- of the federal structure-the states' fixed 
boundaries, territorial integrity, inherent law-making power, and status as 
basic units for the organization of the national government .... "242 The 
courts fail to fulfill this function insofar as they stand idly by while federal 
power usurps all that was once in the states' domain. 
The Garcia argument, that the courts need not police the federal state 
relationship, seconded by the dissent, is a passive endorsement of congres-
sional supremacy over state governments. It should be surprising that Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun, above all others, would be so eager to put 
protections contained in the Bill of Rights at the mercy of the political 
process. As Justice Powell noted in his Garcia dissent, "[o]ne can hardly 
imagine this court saying that because Congress is composed of individuals, 
individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are amply protected by 
the political process. Yet, the position adopted today [in Garcia] is indis-
tinguishable in principle."243 After all, as Powell noted, the Tenth Amend-
ment is no less a part of the Bill of Rights than the other nine,244 and 
eight states made the Tenth Amendment or an equivalent measure a 
condition of their ratification of the Constitution.245 Clearly, it is no more 
an empty admonition or ink blot than any other item in the Bill of Rights. 
In Printz the Court resoundingly rejects this view, for placing the 
protection of state sovereignty in the hands of the Congress inherently 
undermines the federalist architecture at the heart of the constitutional sys-
tem. This holding sits well with Lopez and New York, and demonstrates that 
a majority on the present Court takes federalism seriously. 
ill. PRINTZ V. UNITED STATES AND THE FuTuRE OF FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
With its recent federalist trilogy, the Supreme Court has reinvigorated 
the notion of dual sovereignty, and set limits-albeit minor ones-Dn the 
step, and some otherwise "conservative" justices are openly disdainful of any such effort. See United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence should be "more faithful to the original understanding of that clause"); 
id. at 57 4 (Kennedy, J ., concurring) (noting that stare decisis "forecloses us from reverting to an 
understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th-century economy"). 
242 Briffault, supra note 222, at 1306. 
243 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.8 (1985) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
244 
"The Tenth Amendment also is an essential part of the Bill of Rights." I d. Powell expressed 
incredulity that the Court took the unprecedented step of "abdicat[ing] responsibility for assessing the 
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties theoretically are able to look 
out for their own interests through the electoral process." Id. at 567 n.l2. 
245 ld. at 569 (citing 1-4 DEBATES IN TilE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON TilE ADoPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot, 2d. ed. 1876)). 
1998] THE GREEN AsPECTS OF PRIN1Z 609 
scope of congressional power. As noted at the outset, due to the intricate 
federal-state relationships in environmental policy, these decisions could 
force a reorientation of environmental policy, particularly insofar as the 
federal government relies upon states to do its bidding. In the past few 
years, there have been several federalist challenges to environmental laws, 
and more are certain to follow.246 
A. Pre-Printz Challenges to Federal Environmental Laws 
In the wake of New York v. United States, several state and local 
governments initiated challenges to federal environmental mandates, seeking 
to show that the Court's prohibition on federal efforts to commandeer state 
governments had been violated.247 Even without the Court's reaffirmation 
and extension of the New York doctrine in Printz, federal courts recognized 
that not all federal environmental programs could truly be considered 
"cooperative" in their design, and invalidated some of the more egregious 
examples of federal conscription of state governments. 
1. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Forest Resources Conservation and 
Shortage Relief Act (FRCSRAV48 Ostensibly a conservation measure, as 
written the FRCSRA was clearly designed to protect domestic lumber mills 
by restricting the export of unprocessed logs harvested from either federal 
or state forests in the Western United States.249 Such a policy would 
effectively mandate that timber from Western federal and state lands be pro-
cessed in local lumber mills. 
Tne FRCSRA prohibited all raw log exports from Western states that 
246 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, there have been several Commerce Clause 
challenges to environmental laws, including federal wetlands regulations, Superfund, and the 
Endangered Species Act See Cargill v. United States; 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (denial of certiorari) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Wilson, No. 96-4498, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35971 (4th Cir. 
Dec. 23, 1997); Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, No. 96-5354, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34143 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 5, 1997); United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). However, as of this 
writing only one federal appeals court has looked favorably on such a challenge. See Wilson, 1997 U.S. 
App. LEXIS at *15 (holding that federal regulations limiting development of wetlands tha~ "could 
affect" interstate commerce exceed the scope of the Commerce Clause power). 
247 See, e.g., ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996); Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 
(4th Cir. 1996); Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993); Missouri v. 
United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
248 16 u.s.c. §§ 620-620j (1994). 
249 See id. § 620 (b). The law's export restrictions only applied to government lands in the 
continental United States west of the I OOth meridian. See id. § 620c. 
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sell 400 million board feet or less per year.250 States that sell more than 
400 million board feet were initially only prohibited from exporting 75 
percent of their annual sales.251 At the time the FRCSRA was enacted, 
only Washington State had annual timber sales in excess of 400 million 
board feet 252 In October 1992, the Secretary of Commerce, pursuant to 
the Act, extended the export prohibition to all timber from Western govern-
ment lands irrespective of timber volume.253 Yet, rather than prohibit the 
timber exports directly, the FRCSRA required states to issue their own 
regulations to implement the export bans. 254 
The FRCSRA significantly impacted Western states. Prior to its 
passage, Washington State sold a majority of the timber harvested off of 
state lands overseas due to more favorable market conditions. The revenues 
from state timber sales were largely used to fmance public education and 
county governments. It was estimated that the FRCSRA would result in 
over $500 million in lost revenues.255 Faced with this possibility, the 
Washington State Board of Natural Resources and Board of Education filed 
suit arguing, inter alia, the FRCSRA violated the Tenth Amendment 256 
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held unconstitutional those 
provisions of the FRCSRA that called upon states to implement regulations 
to prohibit the export of unprocessed timber.257 Explicitly relying upon the 
Supreme Court's decision in New York, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
challenged portions of the FRCSRA were "direct commands to the states to 
regulate according to Congress' instructions, and thus violate the principle 
that the 'Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or 
administer a federal regulatory program. "'25g 
The federal government sought to defend the FRCSRA by arguing that 
(a) Washington State could avoid having to implement the export ban by 
ending timber sales from state lands, and (b) the Act's directives to the 
states constituted precatory admonitions rather than legally enforceable 
commands. The Ninth Circuit found neither of these arguments persuasive. 
250 See id. § 620c(b)(l). 
251 See id. § 620c(b )(2). 
252 See Brown, 992 F.2d at 941. 
253 See id. 
254 See 16 U.S.C. § 620c(d). Under this section of the Act, "[e]ach State shall determine the 
species, grade, and geographic origin of unprocessed timber to be prohibited from export ... and shall 
administer such prohibitions consistent with the intent [of the Act] ... " and "the Governor of each 
state to which [the Act) applies ... shall ... issue regulations to carry out the purposes of this 
section .... " By directing the governor to issue regulations, these regulations parallel those of the 
Brady Act struck down in Printz. 
255 See Brown, 992 F.2d at 941. 
256 The suits also alleged that the FRCSRA violates the Fifth Amendment's due process clause and 
federal obligations to land grant trusts. See id. at 942. 
157 See id. at 946. The Court upheld the FRCSRA as against the other challenges. 
258 !d. at 947. 
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In the first instance, the Ninth Circuit held that forcing states to choose 
between implementing export controls and ceasing all timber sales from 
state lands was the sort of "Hobson's choice" that New York explicitly 
invalidated.259 The Ninth Circuit held that the FRCSRA "represents an 
alternative, halting all timber sales, that Congress has no authority to 
command."260 In the second instance, the court recalled that there is a 
"long line of Supreme Court decisions upholding 'the power of federal 
courts to order State officials to comply with federal law. "'261 The 
FRCSRA's lack of its own independent enforcement mechanism did not 
change the mandatory character of the challenged provisions. 262 
2. ACORN v. Edwards 
In 1996, as the various Brady Act cases were winding their way 
through the federal court system, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck 
down another environmental statute for infringing upon state sovereignty. 
The case, ACORN v. Edwards/63 arose when the Association of Commu-
nity Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) and two parents in Louisiana 
sought to enjoin state executive officials to comply with the Lead Contami-
nation Control Act (LCCA) of 1988?64 The case was initially dismissed 
as moot, but the plaintiffs sought and obtained attorney's fees, a decision 
from which the Louisiana state officials appealed. On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the district court's fee award on the grounds that "the 
Plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of a lawful requirement of the Act" 
because the relevant portion of the LCCA was unconstitutional.265 
Congress enacted the LCCA to reduce the perceived risks of childhood 
lead poisoning from lead-lined water tanks or water coolers containing lead 
solder.266 Two provisions of the LCCA imposed requirements upon states. 
The first ordered each state to disseminate information on models of water 
coolers that may contain lead solder or lead-lined tanks to schools and other 
""' /d. 
260 /d. The Court may well have stepped beyond New York with this argument, as it is unclear that 
Congress could not shut down timber sales on state lands if it so desired. 
261 Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 179 (1992)). 
262 In response to the court's decision, Congress amended the FRCSRA, instructing the Secretary 
of Commerce to issue federal regulations directly proscribing the export of unprocessed timber. See 16 
u.s.c. §§ 620c-620d. 
263 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996). 
264 42 u.s.c. §§ 300j-21-26 (1994). 
265 ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1388. 
266 While there is little debate that high-level lead exposure poses a health threat, particularly to 
children, there is some debate as to how serious the threat is at low exposure levels. See, e.g., 
CASSANDRA CHRONES MOORE, HAUNTED HOUSING: HOW TOXIC ScARE STORIES ARE SPOOKING TilE 
Pul!uc Our OF HOUSE AND HOME 79-158 (1997). 
612 GEO. MASON L. REV. [Vol. 6:3 
educational institutions.267 The second mandated that each state "shall 
establish a program ... to assist local educational agencies in testing for, 
and remedying, lead contamination in drinking water .... "268 The court 
only considered the constitutionality of the second requirement, holding that 
the state had effectively complied with the first provision and that the court 
should "avoid unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions."269 Nev-
ertheless, had both provisions been challenged it is likely that both would 
have met the same fate. 
ACORN argued that insofar as Congress acted under its delegated 
powers in Article I, there is no Tenth Amendment obstacle to imposing 
burdens on states. Relying on New York, the Fifth Circuit held otherwise, 
noting that "[t]he Tenth Amendment ... incorporates extra-textual limita-
tions upon Congress' exercise of its Article I powers.'mo That Congress 
has the power to regulate lead-contaminated water coolers was immaterial, 
as the challenged portion of the LCCA fell "squarely within the ambit of 
New York."271 The court held that "[b]ecause § 300j-24(d) deprives States 
of the option to decline regulating non-lead free drinking water coolers, 
we ... conclude that§ 300j-24(d) is an unconstitutional intrusion upon the 
States' sovereign prerogative to legislate as it sees ftt."272 
Section 300j-24(c) escaped the Fifth Circuit's scrutiny because Louisi-
ana officials had effectively complied with its requirement that they 
distribute information on lead-contaminated water coolers to educational 
institutions. Under Printz, however, this provision would be struck down as 
an unconstitutional infringement upon state sovereignty, even if a court 
ruled that the information distribution requirement did not require any 
legislative action by the state. In simple terms, if the federal government 
wants educational institutions to receive information about lead-contamina-
tion, it is free to either (a) provide states with &'1 incentive to undei..ake the 
distribution voluntarily (which Louisiana effectively did), or (b) distribute 
the information itself. It cannot call upon executive officers to meet its 
ends. 
'"
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 300j-24(c). 
268 /d. § 300j-24(d). 
269 ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1392. 
270 /d. at 1393. 
271 /d. at 1394. The Court explained that "Congress· is free, pursuant to its Commerce Clause 
power, to combat lead contamination in drinking water by regulating drinking water coolers that move 
in interstate commerce. Such regulation, however, must operate directly upon the people, and not the 
States as conduits to the people." /d. 
272 !d. 
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B. Federal Environmental Laws Vulnerable to Challenge Under Printz 
Justice Stevens' dissent in Printz explicitly acknowledged that in 
striking down the Brady Act's background check, the Court would also be 
effectively declaring other federal laws which impose ministerial require-
ments on state executives to be unconstitutional.273 Justice Stevens cited 
several federal laws fitting this description. 274 Two of these, sections of 
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and 
the federal statute requiring the collection of data on Underground Storage 
Tanks, are environmental. Insofar as these environmental programs mandate 
state participation, they are as constitutionally suspect as the FRCSRA and 
LCCA. 
1. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA) was enacted in 1986 as Title m of the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act.275 The purpose of EPCRA is to ensure that local 
communities are informed about potential environmental threats from 
hazardous materials and that local governments develop emergency plans in 
case such threats materialize. Among other things, it requires businesses and 
governmental entities to inform local authorities of releases from their 
facilities.276 
EPCRA poses some difficulty for cooperative federalism because it 
also imposes concrete obligations on the governor of each state. In particu-
lar, EPCRA requires that "the Governor of each State shall appoint a State 
emergency response commission."277 If the governor fails to take such 
action, then "the Governor shall operate as the State emergency response 
commission until the Governor makes such designation.'ms The commis-
sion, which may simply consist of the governor herself, "shall designate 
273 The possibility that numerous federal statutes may be invalidated should not detennine the 
outcome of a Supreme Court ruling. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding unicameral 
legislative veto is unconstitutional, despite its frequent enactment). 
n• See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct 2365, 2394 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 40 
Stat 80-1 (registration of young adults for the draft), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001, 11003 (creation of response 
commissions for release of hazardous substances), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a (data collection and reporting on 
underground storage tanks), 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (reporting traffic fatalities), and 42 U.S.C. § 5779 (a) 
(reporting missing children)). 
ns Pub. L. No. 99-499 (1986). Superfund is the common name of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Cleanup, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9674 (1994). 
n• See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11004 (1994). 
m ld. § i iOOi(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
na /d. (emphasis added). 
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emergency planning districts" and "[i]n making such designation, ... shall 
indicate which facilities subject to the requirements of this subtitle are 
within such emergency planning district" and "shall appoint members of a 
local emergency planning committee for each emergency planning dis-
trict."279 The commission (or the governor herself) also "shall review" the 
plans developed by local emergency committees, and "make recommenda-
tions . . . to ensure coordination of such plans with emergency response 
plans of other emergency planning districts."280 The commission must also 
collect emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms from covered 
facilities and make such information available to members of the public 
who file written requests for such information?81 Finally, the governor, 
commission, or local committee "shall [make] available to the general 
public" emergency response plans and information provided by covered fa-
cilities. 282 Failure to fulfill these duties can subject the governor or the 
commission to citizen suits. 283 In sum, EPCRA mandates that state execu-
tive officers, indeed the governor herself, take specific actions, including 
creating what are effectively new state agencies. 284 
The foregoing should make clear that EPCRA directly commands the 
governor of each state to fulfill certain functions. This is an explicit 
violation of the Court's holding in Printz that "[t]he Federal Government 
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular 
problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political 
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. "285 
Unlike the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments, there is 
nothing in EPCRA that gives states an option as to whether to comply. 
There is no regulatory scheme or pot of money that the state can give up to 
avoid EPCP,..l~· .. 's requirements.286 Ivloreover, there are no provisions iii 
219 ld. §§ llOOl(b)-(c) (emphasis added). The emergency planning committees themselves have 
additional obligations to provide public notice for their activities, hold public meetings, and distribute 
an emergency plan. See id. § llOOl(c). Moreover, the committees must prepare and annually revise an 
emergency plan that, among other things, designates community emergency coordinators, provides for 
community notification of releases, develops evacuation plans and develops training programs. See id. 
§ 11003(c). 
280 Id. § ll003(e) (emphasis added). 
281 See id. §§ 11022(a), (e)(3). 
282 ld. § ll044{a). 
283 See id. §§ 11046(a)(l)(C), (D). 
284 
"It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the commission and the committees are state 
regulatory agencies .... By ordering governors to create and fund state regulatory agencies, EPCRA 
forces the executive branch to exercise legislative powers in violation of core separation of powers 
principles." Nicholas J. Johnson, EPCRA's Collision with Federalism, 27 IND. L. REv. 549, 563-64 
(1994). . 
2l!l Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997). 
286 Although in some cases this may not matter. See Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 
F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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EPCRA that suggest failure to abide by its strictures will simply result in 
the state's loss of specific federal funding.287 In that context, the language 
of EPCRA cannot be viewed as discretionary or "precatory admonitions 
rather than commands." Such an argument "ignores the long line of 
Supreme Court decisions upholding 'the power of federal courts to order 
State officials to comply with federal law,"'288 and EPCRA's own lan-
guage authorizing citizen suits to achieve the same purpose.289 Under 
Printz, it is difficult to conclude that substantial portions of EPCRA are not 
unconstitutional. 290 
2. Underground Storage Tanks 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments of 1984291 which amended the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976 (RCRA).292 This legislation included provisions for the regu-
lation of underground storage tanks (USTs), and the approval of state 
programs for such regulation under the traditional cooperative federalism 
model.293 In 1986, provisions were added which are non-discretionary 
requirements contrary to the holding of Printz. Specifically, the UST 
provisions declare that "[e]ach State shall make 2 separate inventories of all 
underground storage tanks in such State containing regulated substanc-
es."294 In addition, "each State shall submit such aggregated data to the 
Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency]."295 These provi-
sions are wholly separate from the regulatory provisions that can be 
included in a discretionary state UST regulatory program.296 
287 Indeed, EPCRA provides for no financial assistance to states whatsoever. It merely authorizes 
"such sums as may be necessary to carry out" its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 11050. 
288 Brown, 992 F.2d at 947 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 179 (1992)). 
m See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11046(a)(I)(C), (D). 
290 Also, given that these provisions of EPCRA are central to its structure in that without the state 
commissions most other provisions of the Act are inoperable, the entire statute may be void. 
The standard for determining the severability of an unconstitutional provision is well 
established: "Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions 
which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be 
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." 
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 108 
(1976)). 
291 Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat 3221 (1984). 
292 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992. 
293 See id. § 699 I. 
294 /d. § 6991a(c). 
29
' Id. (emphasis added). The law also imposes specific requirements upon the owners of USTs to 
report various information about their USTs to "the State or local agency or department designated" by 
the Governor to receive such information. See id. §§ 6991a(a)(I), (b)(I). 
296 See id. § 6991c. The elements of a state program are listed in 42 U.S.C. § 699Ic(a). Where 
ihere is no state program in place, the EPA regulates directly pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6991b, a section 
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There is no doubt that the requirements imposed on states under the 
UST law are less burdensome than those contained in EPCRA or even in 
the Brady Act itself. However, the language of Printz does not admit any 
exceptions for de minimis or negligible intrusions. Rather, the Court was 
clear: "It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-
case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are 
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sover-
eignty."297 By this standard, it would seem that the UST reporting and 
record keeping requirements are as constitutionally suspect as the relevant 
portions of EPCRA. 
C. Cooperative Federalism or Coercive Mandates: The Case of the 
Clean Air Act 
For cooperative federalism to be constitutional, it must be truly 
cooperative. The_ federal government can bribe states with the promise of 
federal funds or threaten states with sanctions. However, it can neither 
direct state legislatures nor commandeer state executive officials. A formal-
istic division between these two types of federal action is possible, but it is 
likely to be arbitrary in practice. Conditional spending can be the basis for 
greater intrusions on state sovereignty than the administrative burdens struck 
down in Printz. Though the Supreme Court has supported the cooperative 
federalism model, it has also acknowledged that "in some circumstance the 
fmancial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass 
the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'"298 
It is fairly clear that those enviromnental progra..."'ls L~at are less 
cooperative in their federalism are constitutionally suspece99 However, 
separate from the notification requirements imposed directly upon states. 
297 Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct 2365, 2384 (1997). But see id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("[T]he Court appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial 
reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce 
Clause powers are similarly invalid."). 
298 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 2ll (1987) (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 
u.s. 548, 590 (1937)). 
299 There is an exception to this general statement in the case of those federal programs that 
impose similar requirements on both private and governmental entities across the board. For example, 
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat 1661 (1974), imposes requirements 
upon all water systems that maintain at least fifteen connections or regularly service more than twenty-
five people, irrespective of whether it is owned and operated by a state or local government or a private 
firm. This sort of regulation is constitutional insofar as it represents a valid exercise of Congress' 
Commerce Clause power (a debatable point) as it does not regulate states qua states. Other examples 
of neutral environmental regulations that apply to both state and local governments and private firms 
would be emission standards, automotive fleet alternative fuel vehicle requirements, and employee 
carpooling rules. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding the 
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to government employers). 
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insofar as some ostensibly "cooperative" federal environmental programs 
become coercive in their implementation, they may suffer from constitution-
al defects as well. In particular, insofar as Congress' spending power is not 
subject to constitutional constraints, it threatens to swallow whole the state 
sovereignty protected by Printz. For just as the dissent's reasoning in Printz 
would have blown a hole in the protections offered by New York, an 
unconstrained conditional spending power can emasculate the federalist 
protections found by the Court in the past five years. 
In 1995, two states filed constitutional challenges to portions of the 
Clean Air Act in federal court.300 Though neither challenge was success-
ful, these two cases demonstrate that states increasingly question the extent 
to which their relationship to the federal government is truly "cooperative" 
in the context of environmental law. These cases suggest that if the princi-
ples underlying the New York, Lopez, and Printz decisions are to be vindi-
cated, the Supreme Court may need to ensure that cooperative federalism 
lives up to the first part of its name. 
1. Court Challenges to the Clean Air Act 
The Clean Air Acf01 is arguably the most contentious environmental 
law ever enacted. The Act is sweeping in its scope and has, at times, sought 
to encourage land use control, restrictions on personal automobile use, and 
outright bans on new development in urban areas that fail to meet federal 
standards. Over the past three decades there has been "substantial friction 
and resistance by states, EPA, and the regulated community to implement-
ing the immensely costly requirements of the Clean Air Act, thereby 
requiring substantial expenditure of regulatory oversight resources and 
imposing costly litigation."302 
The cost and intrusiveness of federal air pollution regulations has 
sparked fierce criticism. The 1990 Amendments to the Act are widely 
considered to be the single most expensive piece of environmental legisla-
tion ever enacted.303 The perception that the Act is inflexible and ineffi-
300 See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996); Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 
1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996), vacated, 109 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 1997). 
"'' 42 u.s.c. §§ 7401-766lf (1994). 
302 Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (but only from a National Perspective) for 
Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225, 307 (1997). 
"'' For example, the ozone non-attainment provisions of the Clean Air Act alone are estimated to 
cost $11.2 billion per year. See Kenneth W. Chilton & Stephen Huebner, Has the Battle Against Urban 
Smog Become "Mission Impossible?", 1996 CENTER FOR TilE STUDY OF AM. Bus. 136. With the 
recent promulgation of new air quality standards, the costs of the Clean Air Act ozone and particulate 
matter non-attainment provisions will continue to increaSe, by as much as $55 billion per year. See 
Kenneth W. Chilton & Stephen Huebner, Beyond the Air Quality Dust Cloud: Fundamental Issues 
Raised by the Air Quality Proposals, 1997 CENTER FOR TilE STUDY OF AM. Bus. 183. 
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cient also fosters political opposition.304 Since 1970, the Act has impressed 
states into regulating air quality in line with federal dictates through the 
State Implementation Plan (SIP) process. Beginning soon thereafter, states 
have resisted. 
All states with metropolitan areas that do not attain the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria air pollutants must 
develop SIPs which they submit to the EPA for its approval. Among other 
things, an adequate SIP must include "enforceable emission limitations ... 
as well as schedules and timetables for compliance/'305 monitoring sys-
tems,306 a fee-based permitting system for stationary sources,307 an en-
forcement program/08 and provide for sufficient public participation in the 
SIP process.309 The 1990 Amendments also added Title V, which requires 
states to develop an omnibus permitting program for stationary sources,310 
complete with permit fees deemed sufficient by the EPA to cover the cost 
of implementation,311 and outlined numerous specific control measures that 
non-attainment areas must include in their SIP.312 "In short, the states' 
role, if they accept, is subject to a great deal of federal specification, 
oversight and approval."313 Failure to submit an adequate SIP by the 
appropriate deadlines314 results in the imposition of federal sanctions, 
including the loss of federal highway funds, increased offset requirements 
for new development, and the imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan 
(FIP) that the EPA will enforce.315 Moreover, local transportation projects 
cannot receive federal funding unless they conform to an EPA -approved 
SIP.316 Although the Clean Air Act fits the cooperative model in that it 
offers states the choice of allowing the federal government to take over air 
304 See K.H. Jones & Jonathan Adler, Time to Reopen the Clean Air Act: Clearing Away the 
Regulatory Smog, CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS, July 11, 1995, at 1. 
305 42 U.S.C. § 74IO(a)(2)(A). 
306 See id. § 7410(a)(2)(B). 
307 See id. § 74IO(a)(2)(L). 
308 See id. §§ 7410(a)(2)(C), (E). 
309 States must provide "reasonable notice" and public bearings on SIPs, and consult with affected 
local entities. !d. § 7410(a)(2)(M). 
310 See id. § 765lo. For a critique of Title V, see BEN LIEBERMAN, TITLE V OF TilE CLEAN AIR 
Acr: WILL AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL Fl.mJRE BE l'ERMriTED (CEI 1995). 
311 This is the sort of measure that illustrates the potential accountability problem when the federal 
govermnent relies upon states to administer federal policy. As David Schoenbrod notes, through Title 
V "unelected federal officials supplanted much of the budgetary and taxing authority of elected state 
officials" through their ability to approve or reject state permit fee schedules. Schoenbrod, supra note 
49, at 265. 
312 See 42 U.S.C. § 75ll(a). 
313 Dwyer, supra note 32, at 1194. 
314 Different regions face different deadlines dependent upon their air quality designation. See 42 
U.S.C. § 7509(a). 
315 See id. § 7509(b). 
316 See id. § 7506. 
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quality regulation, such a decision would come at tremendous cost. 
The sponsors of the original legislation clearly intended for the federal 
government to tell states what to do. Congressman Staggers, who managed 
the Clean Air Act on the floor in 1970, explained that: 
If we left it all to the Federal Government, we would have about everybody on 
the payroll of the United States. We know this is not practical. Therefore the 
Federal Government sets the standards, we tell the States what they must do 
and what standards they must meet. These standards must be put into effect by 
the communities and the States, and we expect them to have the men to do the 
actual enforcing.317 
However, contemporary legal authority for such impositions was certainly 
lacking,318 prompting several states to challenge the law. 
Indeed, in 1973, several states submitted inadequate or incomplete 
SIPs, in outright defiance of the EPA's demands. The EPA responded by 
including requirements that state officials implement transportation control 
measures and land-use regulations at state expense as part of the FIP.319 
Several state and local governments took exception to the EPA's 
attempts to force them to implement federal regulations. They successfully 
challenged the EPA's measures in federal courts. 320 While the states' 
victories were on statutory grounds, several courts expressed serious 
reservations about the constitutional legitimacy of the EPA's actions. In 
particular, the courts separated federal efforts to control pollution from 
industrial sources that impact state-run facilities from federal efforts to 
directly conscript state officers in the administration of a federal program. 
Upholding the EPA's actions, in the Ninth Circuit's view, would have 
endorsed "[a] Commerce [Oause] Power so expanded [that it] would reduce 
the states to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress."321 Such a power "would 
enable Congress to control ever increasing portions of the states' budgets. 
The pattern of expenditures by states would increasingly become a Congres-
317 116 CONG. REc. 19,204 (1970) (statement of Rep. Staggers). 
318 
"But the matter would be very different were Congre&s to invoke the commerce power as a 
justification for compelling state and local governments to implement federal environmental policies. 
There is no close precedent, historical or legal, supporting such an undertaking." Stewart, supra note 
41, at 1223. 
319 Among the requirements pushed by EPA were bus and carpool lanes, vehicle emission 
inspection programs, increased parking fees at municipal facilities, and other measures. Subject states 
were required to find the funds to fulfill these requirements, and the EPA asserted that it could bring 
legal action against state officials that did not comply. 
""' See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom., EPA v. Brown, 431 
U.S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of 
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom., EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 
(1977). A fourth federal appeals court found in favor of the EPA. See Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 
246 (3rd Cir. 1974). 
321 Brown, 521 F.2d at 839. 
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sional responsibility. "322 
After losing in federal court, the EPA appealed a portion of the rulings 
to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted certiorari, but the EPA 
backed off of its position, and conceded that it had exceeded its statutory 
authority, if not constitutional limitations, and the cases were declared 
moot.323 There is little doubt that if the cases were litigated today, the 
EPA's effort to conscript state and local officials would be invalidated 
under Printz and New York. 
The 1970 court battles were hardly the last conflicts between the 
federal and state governments. over implementation of the Clean Air Act. 
After passage of the 1990 Amendments, state and local governments loudly 
protested EPA regulations on automobile emission inspection programs,324 
carpool regulations/25 and permitting program requirements.326 More re-
cently, states took the EPA back to court, raising constitutional objections 
to its uncooperative approach to "cooperative federalism." 
Virginia and Missouri, respectively, challenged the imposition of 
sanctions under the Clean Air Act.327 Both states alleged that the EPA's 
decision, if not the statutory provisions authorizing sanctions themselves, 
were unconstitutional infringements upon state sovereignty. According to 
the states, the Clean Air Act impermissibly authorized the EPA to impose 
severe sanctions upon those states that fail to comply with the EPA's 
interpretation of the Act.328 In particular, the Clean Air Act authorizes the 
EPA to withhold federal highway funds, to increase the "offset" re-
quirements that companies wishing to locate in a non-complying area must 
meet/29 and to preempt the state regulatory program altogether. 330 Impo-
322 /d. at 840. "In essence, the Administrator is here attempting to commandeer the regulatory 
powers of the states, along with their personnel and resources, for use in administering and enforcing 
a federal regulatory program against the owners of motor vehicles." Train, 521 F.2d at 992. 
323 See Brown, 431 U.S. 99. 
324 See Dwyer, supra note 32, at 1208-16. 
315 The federal carpool mandate, which was to be imposed in the eight smoggiest metropolitan 
areas, was rescinded by Congress in 1995. See Clean Air Act Optional Employer Mandated Trip 
Reduction, Pub. L. No. 104-70, 109 Stat 773 (1995) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 751la). It was the first 
use of a new "correction" procedure designed by House Republicans to expedite minor changes to 
regulatory laws needed to "correct" otherwise absurd regulatory requirements. 
326 See Carrie Shook, Title V Terror: Clean Air 'Sleeper' Clause Comes to Haunt, Bus. FIRsT-
COLUMBUS, Oct 23, 1995, at 21. The administrative costs of Title Von states are significant In 1995, 
the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency estimated that it would have to add 100 to 150 new staff 
to implement the program in accordance with federal guidelines. See LIEBERMAN supra note 310, at I, 
12. 
3n See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996); Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 
1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
328 Virginia also argued that the EPA was wrong to conclude that Virginia's stationary source 
permit program failed to comply with Title V of the Clean Air Act See Browner, 80 F.3d at 872. 
329 If a company wishes to build a new factory in a non-attainment area, it must make investments 
to reduce pollution to offset the new facility's marginal contribution to local air pollution. When states 
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sition of either of these first two sanctions, Missouri claimed, would 
produce irreparable harm to the state, due to the magnitude of funding at 
stake and the impact that heightened offset requirements would have upon 
private development within the state.331 Virginia made a similar case.332 
Neither state was successful. 
According to the Fourth Circuit, the Clean Air Act's provisions pass 
constitutional muster "because although its sanctions provisions potentially 
burden the states, those sanctions amount to inducement rather than 'out-
right coercion."'333 The District Court in Missouri reached a similar 
conclusion, relying upon dicta in New York that "conditions [on receipt of 
federal funds] must ... bear some relationship to the purpose of federal 
spending."334 For the Missouri court, "the appropriate focus is not on the 
alleged impact of a statute on a particular state program or economy but 
whether Congress has 'directly compel[led]' the state 'to enact a federal 
regulatory program. "'335 While the Missouri court only addressed the 
question of whether such sanctions were unconstitutional on their face, it 
implied that an as-applied challenge would not fare any better.336 
2. Commandeering through Conditional Spending 
In the wake of Printz, the key question raised by the Virginia v. 
Browner and Missouri litigation for federal environmental law is whether 
imposing conditions upon a state's receipt of federal funds can ever rise to 
the level of being coercive. Both the Fourth Circuit and the Missouri 
District Court relied upon South Dakota v. Dole337 to uphold making 
continued disbursement of highway funds conditional upon satisfactory 
implementation of the Clean Air Act.338 This reliance on Dole may be 
misplaced. As Justice O'Connor noted in her Dole dissent: 
When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is entitled to 
fail to comply, the EPA may increase the proportion of offsets required from 1.15:1 to 2:1. See 42 
u.s.c. § 7509(b)(2). 
330 See id. § 7661a(d)(3). It should be noted, however, that exceptions are made for certain types 
of highway projects, such as those that are necessary to save lives or reduce pollution. See infra note 
353. 
331 See Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1326. 
332 See Browner, 80 F.3d at 874. 
333 /d. at 88 I. 
334 Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1333 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992)) 
(emphasis in Missouri opinion). 
335 /d. at 1328 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 161). 
336 See id. at 1329. Missouri had sought to challenge the provisions on both grounds, but the 
District Court determined that an as-applied claim was not yet ripe. 
337 483 u.s. 203 (1987). 
338 See Browner, 80 F..3d at 881-82; lrfissouri, 918 F. Supp. at i330, 1332-34. 
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insist that the highway be a safe one. But it is not entitled to insist as a condi-
tion of the use of highway funds that the State impose or change regulations in 
other areas of the State's social and economic life because of an attenuated or 
tangential relationship to highway use or safety.339 
In Dole, the Court held that "Congress may attach conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power 'to further 
broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon 
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative 
directives."'340 In particular, the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of Congress' withholding five percent of highway funds from 
states which refused to raise the drinking age to twenty-one. Nonetheless, 
the Court acknowledged that the spending power "is of course not unlimit-
ed,"341 and cannot be used to coerce states into enacting unrelated pro-
grams. Conditional spending must "be in pursuit of 'the general welfare,"' 
and any conditions imposed by Congress must be unambiguous, and related 
to the federal interest in the program in question.342 Moreover, the Court 
held that "other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar 
to the conditional grant of federal funds."343 
The reasons for limiting the use of conditional spending to affect state 
policies should be rather clear. One could imagine a situation in which 
every payment from the federal government to states is conditioned upon 
acquiescence to every jot and iota of federal dictates. Well prior to Printz, 
commentators noted that "such a broad reading of congressional power 
would ::~fford Congress a way to exercise the spending power where it is not 
spending, by drafting grant conditions that reach areas in which the state 
has accepted no funds."344 The conditional grant of funds could eliminate 
the element of choice that must remain when the federal government seeks 
to enlist state assistance and emasculate the Printz decision. 
If the holding in Dole is to place any meaningful restraint upon 
339 Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
'"' Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). Relevant to 
this discussion is the fact that the Court also held that the "Tenth Amendment limitation on congressio-
nal regulation of state affairs [does] not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed 
on federal grants." ld. at 210. The petitioners in Dole sought to argue that Congress' use of the 
spending power to induce states to raise the drinking age violated state sovereignty, particularly the 
provisions of the 21st Amendment which leave the regulation of alcohol to the states. 
341 ld. at 207. 
342 /d. 
"' ld. at 208. 
344 Stewart, supra note 41, at 1261. More recently, Albert Rosenthal noted that "what is decided 
with respect to [conditional] spending could render irrelevant many generally accepted doctrines 
concerning the powers of and limitations upon the federal government .... " Alben Rosenthal, 
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1106 (1987). See also 
Lynn Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLiiM. L. REV. 19ii (1995). 
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Congress' exercise of the spending power, there must be some substantive 
component to the Dole test. In an earlier case the Court explained that "the 
Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions 
relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives 
thereof."345 If Congress is not limited in this manner, "the spending power 
could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal 
authority."346 However, because the Supreme Court has yet to invalidate 
a congressional effort to induce state cooperation through conditional spend-
ing, few lower courts have been willing to do so.347 
Nonetheless, it is not clear that threatening federal highway moneys 
falls squarely within the Dole holding.348 Highway funds are raised from 
a dedicated revenue source in gasoline taxes and placed in the Highway 
Trust Fund. These moneys are explicitly earmarked for transportation 
projects?49 The authorizing legislation suggests many reasons why federal 
funding of highway construction supports the "general welfare," but 
environmental protection is not one of them. In Dole, on the other hand, 
both the highway legislation and the drinking age increase were explicitly 
enacted to improve safety. The connection between the Clean Air Act's 
purpose and transportation is also ambiguous, as states can lose their 
highway funding solely for failing to comply with Title V, a portion of the 
Act that only deals with stationary sources. 
It is certainly true that the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 instructed 
the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that federal highway programs 
were "consistent with any approved plan for the implementation of any am..: 
bient air quality standard for any air quality control region designated 
pursuant to the Clean Air Act, as amended."350 Similarly, the lntermodal 
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA)351 establishes that 
Congress sought to create an environmentally sound interstate highways 
system. Neither of these statutes, however, establishes that a purpose of 
federal highway programs is environmental protection-the relationship test 
set forth in Dole. These statutory provisions provide an indication of what 
3
" Ivanhoe Irrigation DisL v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958). 
346 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). See Baker, supra note 344, at 1920. 
347 See, e.g., Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that conditioning of 
federal appropriations for the District of Columbia on the passage of specified legislation is unconstitu-
tional). 
348 Though it is certain they would fall outside the test articulated by Justice O'Counor in her 
dissenL Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Counor, 1., dissenting). 
349 Of course, many would argue that the "trust fund" system within the federal budget is all 
smoke-and-mirrors. Whether or not this is true when the issue is deficit reduction, a strong argument 
can be made that the federal government has a moral, if not legal, obligation to expend money from 
the trust fund for road purposes and nothing else. 
350 Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 136(b), 84 StaL 1713 (1970), (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 142-
143, 215-216, 321 (1994)). 
351 Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991) (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
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sort of highways Congress sought to fund; they do not establish environ-
mental protection as a purpose of highway funding. This is clearly distin-
guishable from the facts of Dole in which the federal statute calling upon 
states to raise the drinking age echoed the explicit purposes of the federal 
highway programs: safe highways.352 
Another important distinction is the severity of the fmancial penalty to 
which states would be subjected for failing to abide by congressional 
dictates. Dole involved a modest (five percent) loss of highway funds. Yet 
under the Clean Air Act, virtually all highway funds can be put at risk, with 
minor exceptions for special uses.353 Thus, even if the Clean Air Act's 
sanctions are not facially suspect, it must be the case that the imposition of 
sanctions could cross the line from inducement to coercion if enough 
unrelated funds were at stake.354 
In Brown, the Ninth Circuit noted that the formal existence of a 
choice-such as the option to cease all timber sales from state lands-is 
insufficient to make a federal program voluntary.355 Similarly, in 1989, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a conditional spending provision 
for being unduly "coercive" because Congress sought to condition the 
District of Columbia's appropriations upon the enactment of legislation to 
exempt religious institutions from a sexual preference anti-discrimination 
law.356 In Clarke v. United States, the court held that "the severe conse-
quences attendant to rejecting the amendment meant the Council members 
were effectively coerced into not imposing it," in violation of their First 
Amendment rights.357 Citing numerous cases associated with the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions, the court held that "the government may not 
disregard the strictures of the Constitution when conferring discretionary 
benefits."358 
352 For a contrary view, see Laura Rapacioli, Note & Comment, Be Careful What You Ask For: 
Attacking the Constitutionality of the Clean Air Act Operating Permit Program, 14 PACE ENVTI.. L. 
REv. 323 (1996). But see William J. Klein, Note, Pressure or Compulsion? Federal Highway Fund 
Sanctions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 26 RtiTGERS LJ. 855 (1995). 
353 See 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (b)(l). The EPA may not cut off highway funds for projects necessary 
to "resolve a demonstrated safety problem," mass transit, car pooling programs, construction of high-
occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, "programs to limit or restrict vehicle use in downtown areas," and 
other programs that will "improve air quality and would not encourage single occupancy vehicle 
capacity." /d. § 7509 (b)(I)(B). 
354 According to Stewart, "[s]uch a condition, accompanying funds which the state cannot afford 
to forgo, intensifies federal interference with local mechanisms of political accountability by compelling 
states to enforce against their constituencies restrictions the constituencies oppose." Stewart, supra note 
41, at 1255. 
"' Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 1993). 
356 Clarke v. United States 886 F.2d 404, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as nwot, 915 F.2d 699 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). The court found that the conditional grant of funds violated D.C. legislators' First 
Amendment guarantee of free expression. 
357 !d. at 409. 
358 ld. at 410. Among the cases cited by the court were Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) 
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Of course, the rights of states are not always upheld to the same degree 
as those of individuals. In Nevada v. Skinner, decided just before Clarke, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Congress could make ninety-
five percent of a state's highway funds conditional upon that state's setting 
of a 55 miles-per-hour highway speed limit.359 According to Judge 
Reinhardt, the conditional grant of funds did not amount to "coercion" that 
would "leave the state with no practical alternative but to comply with 
federal restrictions."360 This expansive view of Congress' conditional 
spending power is at odds with the substance of Printz and New York. 
Left unrestrained, Congress may use the conditional grant of federal 
funds to achieve those ends that would otherwise be barred by the holdings 
of New York, Lopez, and Printz. States receive federal grants for welfare, 
environmental programs, highways, police, and many other purposes, and 
are therefore quite reliant upon the national fisc. A federal recommendation 
that states implement a desired program or risk losing federal support would 
be quite compelling. Thus, the ultimate import of the Court's recent 
federalist holdings may depend upon whether it opts to limit Congress' 
ability to use conditional spending to bribe and compel state actions. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 
For the past twenty-five years, the federal government has played the 
central role in the formulation, if not implementation, of environmental 
policy. Even the cooperative federalism model presupposes active federal 
oversight and direction of state efforts. The conventional policy presumption 
is that the federal government has the primary responsibility for envi-
ronmental protection. The revival of federalism, as symbolized by Printz 
and other recent cases, suggests that this presumption needs to be reconsid-
ered. 
No doubt the extension of federalist jurisprudence into the environmen-
tal realm will be resisted in federal agencies, the legislature, and the 
courts;361 federal judges are often willing to engage in policy-making from 
(Congress may not condition grant of welfare benefits on waiver of due process rights), and Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment benefits may not be conditional on recipient's 
willingness to work on Sabbath). For an overview of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, and 
one possible jurisprudential approach to it, see RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH TilE STATE 
(1993). 
359 Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989). 
"" Id. at 448. 
361 Judicial reluctance to extend federalism jurisprudence into the environmental area is evident in 
the Lopez-based challenges to federal environmental programs. See Cargill v. United States, 116 S. Ct 
407 (I 995) (denial of certiorari) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (wetlands regulations upheld under Commerce 
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the bench when the stakes are high.362 The presumption is that without 
active federal involvement, there will be insufficient environmental protec-
tion. This view is misguided. There are few reasons to assume that, in the 
1990s, environmental protection efforts must be centralized at the federal 
level in order to be effective. 
In practical terms, states are already responsible for the bulk of 
environmental enforcement and policy implementation;363 it is merely 
priority setting from which they are excluded. Removing states from the 
environmental picture is not possible. 364 Twenty years ago Richard Stewart 
noted the "sobering fact is that environmental quality involves too many 
intricate, geographically variegated physical and institutional interrelations 
to be dictated from Washington."365 This is even more true today as 
environmental policy is increasingly focused on smaller, more complex 
problems which are tied to local conditions. 
Three basic arguments were put forward to justify the federal 
. government's entrance upon the environmental stage in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s: (1) cross-boundary pollution ("spillovers"); (2) states' failure 
or inability to provide for adequate environmental protection (economies of 
scale); and (3) interstate competition (the "race-to-the-bottom"V66 Others 
have suggested that national policies are more suited to the pursuit of moral 
ideals, such as those which underlie environmentalism.367 Similar argu-
Clause); National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Endangered 
Species Act regulations upheld under Commerce Clause); United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506 (lith 
Cir. 1997) (Superfund regulations upheld under Commerce Clause). But see United States v. Wilson, 
No. 96-4498, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35971 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997) (wetlands regulations invalidated 
under Commerce Clause). 
362 Indeed, the Printz dissent opens by praising the Brady Act as a "remarkable success" and a 
wise public policy response to the "epidemic of gun violence." Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct 2365, 
2386 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The federal government also appealed to these sentiments, 
arguing ihat ihe Brady law should be upheld, inter alia, because it "serves very important purposes." 
Printz;, 117 S. Ct at 2383. No doubt similar arguments would be marshaled to defend environmental 
statutes from a federalism challenge. 
363 See Tom Arrandale, Environment: Pollution Control Has Been Steadily Propelled Away from 
Washington to the States, GoVERNING, Oct. 1997, at 36. The Environmental Council of the States 
reports that states are responsible for over 85% of environmental enforcement actions and approximate-
ly 80% of environmental program expenditures. See Robert E. Roberts, Debunking the 'Race to the 
Bottom' Myth, EcOSTATES, Nov. 1997, at 13. 
364 No one has argued that state and local governments should be excluded altogether from 
environmental policy. Some have argued, however, that governments generally should be excluded 
from the formulation and enforcement of environmental policy, beyond the use of courts and other 
dispute resolution mechanisms. See, e.g., TERRY ANDERSON & DoNALD LEAL, FREE MARKET 
ENviRONMENTALISM (1991); Smith, A Critical Reappraisal, supra note 42; Fred L. Smith, Jr., A Free-
Market Environmental Program, 11 CATO J. 457 (1992); Fred L. Smith, Jr., The Market and Nature, 
THE FREEMAN, Sept. 1993, at 352; Richard Stroup, Controlling Earth's Resources: Markets or Social-
ism?, POPULATION & ENV'T, Spring 1991, at 265. 
365 Stewart, supra note 41, at 1266. 
366 These arguments are summarized in Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 
MICH. L. REv. 570, 601-02 nn.101-03 (1996). 
367 This argument is put forward in Stewart, supra note 41, at 1217-19. Stewart also suggests three 
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ments are used today to defend the central place of the federal government 
in environmental policy from calls for decentralization.368 
Each of the arguments put forward in defense of national supremacy in 
environmental policy is at least open to question, if not demonstrably false. 
There is little reason to believe that genuine environmental protection will 
suffer from judicially enforced limits on federal power. There are also 
independent arguments for increasing state and local autonomy on environ-
mental matters so as to encourage greater political accountability and 
innovation in environmental policy. Courts should not seek to identify 
public policy justifications for resisting the logical extension of federalism 
jurisprudence into the environmental realm. 
A. Spillovers 
Cross-boundary pollution, like any interstate externality, is a valid 
concern in environmental policy. If State A can pollute State B without fear 
of retribution, it has successfully externalized its environmental costs. 
Absent some external controls or dispute resolution system, this situation 
can lead to significant environmental harm. But the mere existence of such 
externalities does not necessarily call for a centralized regulatory bureaucra-
cy. There are other means of dealing with at least some spillover problems, 
including compacts and regional authorities/69 and common law nuisance 
actions.370 Pollution tends to ignore political boundaries, but that does not 
mean that every environmental problem is national. Where environmental 
concerns are regional in scope, there is an argument for entrusting a 
regionally-based entity or group with devisi.r1g a..11 adequate solution.371 
other "structural factors" which hinder environmental quality on a decentralized basis which overlap 
with the historical factors identified by Esty. They are (I) national economies of scale; (2) the disparate 
under-representation of environmental interests at the state level; and (3) spillovers. See id. at 1211-17. 
368 See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 302. 
369 For instance, Congress authorized the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact between California 
and Nevada in 1969, creating the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency which overseas the Lake Tahoe 
basin. See Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat 3234 (1969). See also BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND 
COMMON LAw FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 27, 57 (1997) (discussing the Ohio River Sanitation Commis-
sion). 
370 See, e.g., ELizABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGIITS IN DEFENSE OF NATURE (1995); Roger E. 
Meiners, Elements of Property Rights: The Common Law Alternative, in LAND RIGIITS: THE 1990s 
PROPERTY RIGIITS REBELUON (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995); Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Clean 
Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal?, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 88-93 (Bruce 
Yandle & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1993). 
371 It is also worth noting that while concerns about spillovers a..re generally accepted as an 
explanation for the nationalization, many national statutes are more focused on intrastate pollution than 
interstate pollution, and that even where federal rules address potential spillover effects, federal 
enforcement has been less strict in the interstate context See Schoenbrod, supra note 49, at 260-61. 
"Thus, the national takeover of environmental law must be defended, if it can be defended at all, on 
the basis that Washington should regulate local pollution." /d. at 261. 
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It should also be remembered that interstate pollution problems, 
particularly those that are national in scope, are still the exception, not the 
norm.372 Most urban air pollution problems are local or regional, not 
interstate. Houston's failure to meet the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard for ozone does not affect Baton Rouge, let alone Philadelphia.373 
Drinking water systems serve the local communities in which they are 
based. Superfund sites are local sites that rarely, if ever, impact other states. 
Thus, even if one accepts the spillover argument for national environmental 
regulation, it cannot be used to justify regulation in each and every 
case.374 
B. Economies of Scale 
Many states were engaged in environmental protection prior to the 
1970s.375 Nonetheless, there were several reasons why concerns about 
economies of scale encouraged the federal government to enter upon the 
environmental stage. Relatively little was known about environmental policy 
in the 1970s. Research and analysis were necessary to identify all but the 
most obvious problems and solutions, so it seemed logical that centralizing 
expertise would allow for a sound setting of priorities. Today, however, the 
states spend more money on environmental matters and employ more 
environmental bureaucrats than does the federal government. Research on 
environmental issues has proliferated and is easily available through 
research libraries and the Internet. Centralized expertise is no longer 
372 This argument ignores "psychic" or aesthetic spillovers, such as when one jurisdiction allows 
for economic development that offends the environmental values of those in another jurisdiction, as 
would occur if one state allows the cutting of trees on land deemed a pristine wilderness by outsiders. 
It is questionable whether the federal government should regulate based upon such concerns and, if it 
does, how the proper measure of such regulation is determined. For instance, the use of "contingent 
valuation" or other means of indirectly measuring the psychic, aesthetic, or even religious value placed 
upon such environmental amenities is fraught with difficulty. See, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, Does "Ex-
istence Value" Exist?--Environmental Economics Encroaches on Religion, lNDEP. REv., Spring 1997, 
at 499. 
m Of course, in some parts of the country, particularly the Northeast, air pollution is a regional 
interstate problem. Air pollution in Philadelphia, for example, significantly impacts air quality across 
the river in Camden, New Jersey. However, such regional problems do not make the case for national 
intervention. 
374 Esty makes the argument that U.S. environmental policy should be infonned by the idea of 
subsidiarity. That is to say that each environmental problem should be dealt with by the level of 
government-local, state, national, international-best positioned to address that particular concern: 
"the challenge is to find the best fit possible between environmental problems and regulatory 
responses-not to pick a single level of government for all problems." Esty, supra note 366, at 574 
(citation omitted). 
375 See, e.g., Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Western States and Environmental Federalism: An 
fuamination of Institutional Viability, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 225-57 (Terry Anderson & 
Peter J. Hill eds., 1997). 
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necessary; it can actually be counterproductive. As noted below, the record 
shows that some states may even have a thing or two to teach the federal 
government.376 
In addition, the local and regional nature of many environmental 
problems means that local knowledge and expertise is necessary to develop 
proper solutions.377 Such localized knowledge is inevitably beyond the 
reach of even the most intrepid federal regulators.378 The most effective 
and equitable strategy for controlling ozone ("smog") precursors will vary 
from city to city based upon the local mix of stationary and mobile sources, 
the relative age of the automobile fleet, and dominant weather conditions, 
for example. One-size-fits-all can very easily become one-size-fits-nobody. 
Moreover, when policies are nationalized, it can become difficult for those 
communities which suffer disproportionately from policy errors or omis-
sions to get their concerns addressed.379 Indeed, it is possible to conclude, 
like Butler and Macey, that "whatever the economies of scale associated 
with the centralization of environmental policy, they are surely over-
whelmed by the diseconomies of scale in centralized administration. "380 
While states are typically characterized as having done too little to 
address environmental concerns, some have suggested that at least a few 
states may have done too much. It is certainly arguable that national 
corporate interests may have preferred uniform national standards to the 
patchwork of state standards which was emerging at the time the federal 
environmental regime was erected.381 Given the extent of special-interest 
376 See infra Part IV.C. 
3n "The enviiunmental ha.-m caused by the emission of the sa1ne R!TIO!!!!t of pollution can vary 
widely, depending on local environmental conditions." HENRY N. BUlLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, 
USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENviRONMENTAL POUCY 27 (1996). 
378 Ecological central planning, while perhaps more well-intentioned, is no more conceivable to 
implement than economic central planning, not least because of what Nobel laureate F.A. Hayek 
termed the "knowledge problem." See Hayek, supra note 44, at 519-30. This point is also made by 
Butler and Macey: "Federal regulators never have been and never will be able to acquire and assimilate 
the enormous amount of information necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the 
technical requirements of particular locations and pollution sources." BUlLER & MACEY , supra note 
377, at 27. 
379 This concern for political accountability was an issue for the court in Printz. See supra Part 
D.C. 
3
"' BUlLER & MACEY, supra note 377, at 27. 
381 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization 
of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 313, 326-29 (1985). In the early 1960s, Lloyd Cutler 
reportedly recommended that national auto manufacturers support granting the federal government 
authority to set national vehicle emission standards to preempt state standards. "He reasoned that the 
companies would be able to keep the secretary [of Health Education and Welfare] from imposing 
expensive pollution reduction measures .... " Schoenbrod, supra note 49, at 261. Congress authorized 
federal standards in 1965, and preempted state standards in 1967. See id. 
For modem examples of this phenomenon in the air pollution policy context, see Jonathan Adler, 
Watching Paint Dry, REG., 1995 No.4, at 23 (national paint manufacturers seek national evaporative 
emission standards that will hurt regional, specialty paint manufacturers), and Jones & Adler, supra 
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manipulation of environmental policy / 82 this argument cannot be rejected 
out of hand. 
C. The "Race-to-the-Bottom" 
The "race-to-the-bottom" argument is rather straightforward: Faced 
with the prospect of competition from other states, states will lower their 
environmental standards to attract and retain corporate investment. As 
Stewart suggested, "[i]f each locality reasons the same way, all will adopt 
lower standards of environmental quality than they would prefer if there 
were some binding mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact 
higher standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or devel-
opment."383 This argument is also flawed.384 
There is a fundamental conceptual problem with the "race-to-the-
bottom" argument, for it assumes that any change to existing environmental 
standards or regulations which makes them less onerous and burdensome 
must necessarily come· at the expense of environmental protection and 
overall social welfare. This presumption is unfounded. Given the strong 
public support for environmental protection, it is just as likely that states 
will compete on both economic and environmental grounds. Under this 
model, state legislators and executive officials will seek out innovative ways 
of making environmental programs more flexible, predictable and efficient, 
without compromising environmental quality.385 
Empirical evidence suggests this is actually the case in this country. 
First, it is not uncommon for states to exceed federal regulatory require-
ments when there is a particularly acute environmental concern. 386 Accord-
note 304, at 23-25 (national auto manufacturers seek imposition of low-emission vehicle standard in all 
states except California as alternative to a regional standard imposed in the northeastern United States). 
382 See, e.g., Adler, Reni-Seeking, supra note 205, at 26; see generally ENVIRONMENTAL POUTICS, 
supra note 205. 
"" Stewart, supra note 41, at 1212. It is interesting to note that the "race-to-the-bottom" argument 
is fundamentally at odds with the contention advanced by some that environmental regulations do not 
entail significant environmental cost If environmental regulations are so costly that no state will imple-
ment them alone because the regulatory cost will drive away economic development, then surely 
environmental controls are a significant cost of doing business. Conversely, if the cost of environmental 
regulations is substantially overblown, as some environmentalists contend, then there is no fear of a 
"race-to-the-bottom" absent the creation of a federal floor. 
384 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-
to-the-Bonom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992). 
3
"' Revesz points out that it is wrong to assume that competition between states necessarily 
produces less stringent pollution controls and that reducing such controls is always socially undesirable. 
See Revesz, supra note 384, at 1219. One could only make these assumptions if one were to equate 
environmental protection with the promulgation of regulations rather than with direct measures of 
environmental quality. 
386 See, e.g., Dana C. Joel, Rhetoric vs. Reality: New Jersey Regulatory Reform, REG., 1996 No. 
2, at 53. "A state where regulations frequently exceed federal requirements, New Jersey contains some 
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ing to Robbie Roberts of the Environmental Council of the States, "[a]lmost 
every State has some area where it has either adopted a standard higher 
than the federal standard or adopted a standard in an area where there was 
no federaJ standard."387 Second, despite the dominant federal role in most 
pollution-control matters, many states are seeking to create business-friendly 
environments through administrative reforms that will not compromise 
environmental protection. 
Despite extensive federal involvement in environmental policy, many 
states have become green "laboratories of democracy,"388 experimenting 
with new ways of advancing environmental protection. 389 For instance, 
forty states have their own hazardous waste site cleanup programs. The 
performance of these programs compares favorably with the federal pro-
gram; states are cleaning up hazardous waste sites faster and less expensive-
ly than the federal government.390 Side-by-side comparisons of state and 
federal forests are even more striking. National forests lose money on 
timber sales and have a poor record of environmental protection; state 
forests, such as those in Montana, tum a profit and have superior envi-
ronmental performance.391 While the environmental policy debate centers 
on Washington, states are developing the next generation of environmental 
policies from air quality to park management. 392 A judicial reinvigoration 
of federalism can only serve to further invigorate the experimentation and 
innovation that is going on at the state level. 
If it were demonstrably true that most states would lower their envi-
ronmental standards in order to attract industry, then there would be a 
potential case for federal standards. But this downward pressure cannot jus-
tify extensive federal mandates directing states to administer particular 
programs in a particular fashion. Yet that is the dominant model of "coop-
erative federalism" in use today. This is further evidence that the Printz 
decision and the revival of state autonomy do not threaten environmental 
protection so much as they may threaten the existing federal approach to 
environmental policy. 
of the most costly regulations in the nation." Id. at 55. 
387 Roberts, supra note 363, at 14. 
388 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
389 See, e.g., David L. Markell, States as Inrwvators: It's Time for a New Look to Our "Laborato-
ries of Democracy" in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. 
REv. 347 (1994). 
390 See J. Winston Porter, Cleaning Up Superfund: The Case for State Environmental Leadership, 
REAsON FOUND. POL'Y STUDY 195 (1995). 
3
" See Donald Leal, Turning a Profit on Public Forests, PERc POUCY SERIES PS-4 (1995). 
392 A catalog of state-level innovations in environmental policy can be found on the Environmental 
Council of the States' web site, Innovative Ideas (visited Feb. 12, 1998) 
<http://www .sso.orglecoslinnovate.htm>. This list would be significantly more extensive were it not for 
the obstructions posed by federal mandates. "State-by-state experiment ... disappears with federal 
mandates. Yet experiment is what we need." Schoenbrod, supra note 49, at 264. 
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D. What Do People Want? 
These are not the only arguments suggesting that a devolution of 
authority over environmental policy making can and should occur in the 
wake of Printz. There is no doubt that most Americans consider themselves 
to be environmentalists, but there is no longer uniform agreement as to 
what "environmentalism" means (if there ever was).393 There are conserva-
tionists and preservationists, those who recognize nature's instrumental 
value and those who appreciate its intrinsic worth. Some want to actively 
restore ecosystems and landscapes, other would like as much of the world 
as possible left alone. With all these differences, there is certainly an 
argument to be made for allowing environmental pluralism. Indeed, many 
of the grass-roots criticisms of environmental policy, from both the left and 
the right, tacitly call for a return of power closer to home.394 
The public's broad support for environmental protection is often 
confused with public support of existing policies, in particular, and an 
extensive federal role in environmental policy more generally. Joshua 
Sarnoff, for instance, writes that "the data strongly and consistently indicate 
that a 'supermajority' of the national voting public continues to support 
preserving and even expanding the traditional federal role in protecting the 
environment."395 This is only the case if one conflates support for current 
or increased levels of environmental protection with federal action. When 
voters are given the choice as to which level of government they would 
prefer to direct environmental policy, they almost invariably choose state 
and local governments over the federal government. For instance, in a 1996 
national survey of registered voters, sixty-five percent of those surveyed felt 
that state or local government was better at environ.'llental protection, and 
large majorities agreed that state or local government should have the 
"primary responsibility" for protecting water quality and should determine 
which air pollution control measures are enacted.3% Rightly or wrongly, 
a substantial number of Americans believe there is nothing incompatible 
with the devolution of power and environmental protection. 
393 Some of the various approaches are discussed in ADLER, ENviRONMENTAUSM supra note 12, 
ch. 6. See also MARK DOWIE, LoSING GROUND (1995); WALLACE KAUFMAN, NO TURNING BACK: DIS-
MANTLING TilE FANTASIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL THINKING (1994); MARTIN LEWIS, GREEN DELUSIONS: 
AN ENVIRONMENTAUST CRiTIQUE OF RADICAL ENviRONMENTAUSM (1992). 
394 This is particularly evident with the environmental justice movement and the property rights 
and "wise-use" movements. See ADLER, ENvlRONMENTAUSM, supra note 12, ch. 6. 
395 Sarnoff, supra note 302, at 319 n.3l. 
396 THE POLLING Co., supra note 66, at 8, 10. 
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CONCLUSION 
If the Court adheres to the principles it enunciated in Printz, the 
federalist revival will spread. With renewed judicial vigilance against over-
reaching congressional enactments will come increased accountability within 
the political process. As the Court noted, whether state and local govern-
ments are forced to pay the costs of implementing federal programs or not, 
they often take the blame for the burdensomeness of programs designed in 
Washington, D.C.397 For this reason, the federal government's ability to 
direct state and local governments must be proscribed. This concern for 
accountability in the federal system is as acute in the environmental arena 
as any, if not more so. The proliferation of codes, standards, and agencies 
at all levels of government has short-circuited accountability in environmen-
tal policy.398 
Federalism's return to the Supreme Court's focus should be welcomed, 
even in the realm of environmental policy. Adhered to by federal courts, the 
federalist revival will accelerate the reformulation of environmental policy 
for the next century. They offer the opportunity to reawaken state experi-
mentation and revisit the nationalisi assumptions underlying contemporary 
environmental policy. 
Opponents of federal gun control may have cheered the loudest when 
the Brady Act was declared unconstitutional, but the green aspects of Printz 
may yet prove to be the sweetest.399 
397 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. CL 2365, 2382 (1997). 
3
"' See Schoenbrod, supra note 49, at 264. 
399 With further apologies to the Bard, see supra note 1. 
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